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Abstract
The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction is the primary auction used for monetizing the use
of the Internet. It is well-known that truthtelling is not a dominant strategy in this auction and that
inefficient equilibria can arise. Edelman et al. (AER, 2007) and Varian (IJIO, 2007) show that an
efficient equilibrium always exists in the full information setting. Their results, however, do not extend
to the case with uncertainty, where efficient equilibria might not exist.
In this paper we study the space of equilibria in GSP, and quantify the efficiency loss that can arise
in equilibria under a wide range of sources of uncertainty, as well as in the full information setting.
The traditional Bayesian game models uncertainty in the valuations (types) of the participants. The
Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction gives rise to a further form of uncertainty: the selection of
quality factors resulting in uncertainty about the behavior of the underlying ad allocation algorithm. The
bounds we obtain apply to both forms of uncertainty, and are robust in the sense that they apply under
various perturbations of the solution concept, extending to models with information asymmetries and
bounded rationality in the form of learning strategies.
We present a constant bound (2.927) on the factor of the efficiency loss (price of anarchy) of the
corresponding game for the Bayesian model of partial information about other participants and about ad
quality factors. For the full information setting, we prove a surprisingly low upper bound of 1.282 on
the price of anarchy over pure Nash equilibria, nearly matching a lower bound of 1.259 for the case of
three advertisers. Further, we do not require that the system reaches equilibrium, and give similarly low
bounds also on the quality degradation for any no-regret learning outcome. Our conclusion is that the
number of advertisers in the auction has almost no impact on the price of anarchy, and that the efficiency
of GSP is very robust with respect to the belief and rationality assumptions imposed on the participants.
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1 Introduction
The sale of advertising space on the Internet, or AdAuctions, is the primary source of revenue for many
providers of online services. According to a recent report [13], $25.8 billion dollars were spent in online
advertisement in the US in 2010. The main part of this revenue comes from search advertisement, in which
search engines display ads alongside organic search results. The success of this approach is due, in part, to
the fact that providers can tailor advertisements to the intentions of individual users, which can be inferred
from their search behavior. A search engine, for example, can choose to display ads that synergize well with
a query being searched. However, such dynamic provision of content complicates the process of selling
ad space to potential advertisers. Each search query generates a new set of advertising space to be sold,
each with its own properties determining the applicability of different advertisements, and these ads must
be placed near-instantaneously.
The now-standard mechanism for resolving online search advertisement requires that each advertiser
places a bid that represents the maximum she would be willing to pay if a user clicked her ad. These bids
are then resolved in an automated auction whenever ads are to be displayed. By far the most popular bid-
resolution method currently in use is the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction, a generalization of the
well-known Vickrey auction. In the GSP auction, there are multiple ad “slots” of varying appeal (e.g. slots
at the top of the page are more effective). In two seminal papers Edelman et al. [11] and Varian [36] propose
a simple model of the GSP auction that we will also adopt in this paper. They observe that truthtelling is
not a dominant strategy under GSP, and GSP auctions do not generally guarantee the most efficient outcome
(i.e., the outcome that maximizes social welfare). Nevertheless, the use of GSP auctions has been extremely
successful in practice. This begs the question: are there theoretical properties of the Generalized Second
Price auction that would explain its prevalence? Edelman et al. [11] and Varian [36] provide a partial
answer to this question by showing that, in the full information setting, a GSP auction always has a Nash
equilibrium that has same allocation and payments as the VCG mechanism. [11] and [36] give only informal
arguments to justify the selection of envy-free equilibria.
We argue that the Generalized Second Price auction is best modeled as a Bayesian game of partial
information. Modeling GSP as a full information game assumes that each auction is played repeatedly with
the same group of advertisers, and during such repeated play the bids stabilize. The resulting stable set of
bids is well modeled by a full information Nash equilibrium. The analyses of Edelman et al. [11] and Varian
[36] provide important insight into the structure of the GSP auction under this assumption. However, the set
and types of players can vary significantly between rounds of a GSP auction. Each query is unique, in the
sense that it is defined not only by the set of keywords invoked but also by the time the query was performed,
the location and history of the user, and many other factors. Search engines use complex machine learning
algorithms to select the ads, and more importantly to determine appropriate quality scores (or factors) for
each advertiser for a particular query, and then decide which advertiser to display. This results in uncertainty
both about the competing advertisers, and about quality factors. We model this uncertainty by viewing the
GSP auction as a Bayesian game, and ask: what are the theoretical properties of the Generalized Second
Price auction taking into account the uncertainty that the advertisers face?
Bounding the quality of outcomes: Price of Anarchy. To answer the question above, we offer a quanti-
tative understanding of the inefficiencies that can arise in GSP auctions, using a metric known as the Price
of Anarchy. We show that the welfare generated by the auction in any equilibrium of bidding behavior is
at least a 1η -fraction of the maximum achievable welfare (i.e., the welfare the auction could generate know-
ing the player types and quality factors in advance). The value of η measures the robustness of an auction
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with respect to strategic behavior: in the worst case, how much can strategic manipulation harm the social
welfare. The closer η is to 1, the more robust the auction is. An auction that always generates efficient
outcomes at equilibrium would have price of anarchy equal to 1. We bound the inefficiency of the outcomes
both in the Bayesian version of the game as well as the full information game, and extend the analysis also
for learning outcomes.
We develop a general technique for bounding the inefficiency of outcomes that allows us to do this
in the most general setting, even in Bayesian games with multiple, correlated sources of uncertainty. Our
framework of semi-smooth games is an extension of Roughgarden’s [31] smoothness framework, that allows
dealing with correlated distributions. Correlated distributions are an important feature of the GSP model,
especially when modeling quality factors, as the same facts affect clickability and hence the quality factors
for all advertisers. (For instance, an ad shown to a bot will not get a click independent of the advertiser.)
For mechanisms that are not dominant strategy truthful, like GSP auctions, price of anarchy analysis is a
powerful tool for quantifying the potential loss of efficiency at equilibrium. We conduct this analysis both in
a full information setting without uncertainty (in which the price of anarchy is surprisingly small, indicating
a loss of at most 22% of the welfare), but also in a setting with uncertainty and a very general information
structure, in which we prove that the price of anarchy is still bounded by a small constant. This shows
that while the GSP auction is not guaranteed to be efficient, it is a reasonably good design, as remarkably,
the welfare loss of these auctions is bounded by a value that does not depend on the number of players,
the number of advertisements for sale, or the prior distributions on player types. In contrast, the variant
of the Generalized Second Price auction that orders advertisers by their bid ignoring quality factors, which
has been historically used by Yahoo!, results in a quality loss proportional to the range of quality factors,
while randomly assigning advertisers to slots can result in a loss of efficiency proportional to the number of
advertisers.
One feature of our results is that they hold for a variety of models regarding the rationality and the beliefs
of the players. This robustness is particularly important in large-scale auctions conducted over the Internet,
where assumptions of full information and/or perfect rationality of the participants are unreasonably strong.
The GSP auction and sources of uncertainty. By far the most popular auction method currently in use
for search ads is the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction, a generalization of the well-known Vickrey
auction. The GSP auction is invoked every time a user queries a keyword of interest; it is a repeated auction
in which players repeatedly bid for ad slots. However, modeling equilibrium strategies in a repeated game
of this nature is notoriously difficult, and results in a game with a plethora of unnatural equilibria due to
the possibility of bids representing threats for future rounds, optimal exploration of the bidding space, and
so on. A common simplification used in the literature is to focus on auctions for a single keyword, and to
suppose that players will quickly learn each others’ valuations and reach a stationary equilibrium. Under
this assumption, the stationary equilibrium would correspond naturally to a Nash equilibrium in the full
information, one-shot version of the GSP auction [12]. It has therefore become common practice to study
pure, full information equilibria of the one-shot game, as an approximation to expected behavior in the more
general repeated game [11, 36, 28].
In reality, however, the set and types of players can vary significantly between rounds of a GSP auction:
each query is unique, in the sense that it is defined not only by the set of keywords invoked but also the
time the query was performed, the location and history of the user, and many other factors. This context is
taken into account by an underlying ad allocation algorithm, which is controlled by the search engine. The
ad allocation algorithm not only selects which advertisers will participate in an auction instance, but also
assigns a quality factor to each advertiser. As a first approximation we can think of the quality factor as
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a score that measures how likely that participant’s ad will be clicked for that query. These quality factors
are then used to scale the bids of the advertisers. These scaled bids are known as effective bids, which
can be viewed as bids derived from a similarly-modified effective type. Under our assumption that quality
factors measure clickability, the effective type of an advertiser is the expected valuation of displaying the ad
(valuation of the ad times its likelihood of getting a click). The effective bid and effective type of a player are
therefore random variables, which can be thought of as the original valuations multiplied by quality scores
computed exogenously by the search engine. Athey and Nekipelov [3] point out that the uncertainty in
quality factors produces qualitative changes in the structure of the game. Thus, even if players converge to a
stationary bidding pattern, the resulting equilibrium cannot be described as the outcome of a full information
game.
We model the uncertainty about the effective types of advertisers as a Bayesian, partial information
game. That is, the inherent uncertainty due to context and the ad allocation algorithm can be captured via
prior distributions over effective types, even when the true types of all potential competitors are fully known.
The appropriate equilibrium notion is then the Bayes-Nash equilibrium with respect to these distributions.
Our model allows arbitrary correlations between the types and quality factors. The uncertainty of ad quality
and allocation mostly comes from the query context, and hence is best modeled by correlated distributions
of types and ad quality. Search engines use complex machine learning algorithms to compute quality factors
based on all available information about the context, whose outcome is hard to predict for the advertisers.
Search engines share distributional information about quality factors with advertisers. We model this by
assuming that the advertisers are aware of the distribution of quality factors. Further, we also assume that
the quality factors computed by the search engine correspond exactly to the clickability of the ad.
Summarizing, there are two main sources of uncertainty: the first is about the quality factors that the
search engine attributes to each advertiser and the second is about the valuations (types) of the players.
These sources are different in nature: each advertiser has knowledge of (and can condition her behavior on)
her own type, whereas quality factors are fully exogenous and are only revealed ex post.
Asymmetric information. There are different types of players in advertising markets, which may have
differing levels of information about their competitors. We assume all players know their own valuations
correctly, but some smaller players (such as individual advertisers) might be clueless about the valuations of
the other players and expected behavior of quality scores, while others (say bidding agencies or large com-
panies with web advertising departments) may have a much better understanding of how individual rounds
of the auction will proceed. Even among this latter group, different advertisers may have access to differ-
ent information. We can model such information asymmetries by giving each player access to an arbitrary
player-specific signal that can carry information about the effective types of the auction participants. Our
bounds on social efficiency in the Bayesian model hold in settings with such asymmetry in information.
Learning players. So far we have considered equilibria of the auction game. Analyzing equilibria makes
the strong assumption that players reach equilibrium play. Learning outcomes provide a very appealing
generalization. A now standard model considers a repeated version of the game, and assumes that players
employ strategies that give them vanishingly small regret over time. Roughly speaking, such a model as-
sumes that players observe the bidding patterns of others and modify their own bids in such a way that their
long-term performance is at least as good as a single optimal strategy chosen in hindsight. Notice that if all
players employ the same (possibly randomized) strategy in each round, the resulting stable strategies form a
Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the no-regret assumption of repeated play is a generalization of the notion of
Nash equilibrium. Further, there are many simple bidding strategies that yield vanishing regret over time, as
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discussed below. The no-regret assumption does not require that players follow one of these algorithms; in
fact, good play can result in better utility than simply no-regret, e.g., if the player can anticipate the behavior
of other players. Rather, the assumption models a natural rationality: if there is a consistently good strategy
players will attempt to learn this over time, and do at least as well (or better) as this good fixed strategy.
In this sense, the no-regret assumption aims to capture the intuition that players attempt to learn beneficial
bidding strategies over time, while also providing a generalization of Nash equilibrium play. We view the
existence of simple learning algorithms as supporting this assumption. If all players have no-regret this will
cause the empirical distribution of the bids to converge to a coarse correlated equilibrium of the game, a
slight generalization of the well-known correlated equilibrium.
We therefore assume that the players use algorithms to learn how to best bid given their valuation and
signal, and achieve vanishing regret over time. In other words, for each possible valuation and signal,
repeated auctions allow players to learn how to best bid taking into account the varying bids of other players,
and the uncertainty about quality factors, other players’ valuations, and bidding strategies. We will consider
the quality degradation of the average social outcome when all players employ strategies with small regret.
Blum et al. [6] introduced the term Price of Total Anarchy for this analog of the price of anarchy.
Approximate rationality. One of the fundamental assumptions in auction analysis is that all players are
perfectly rational utility optimizers. However, in reality (and especially in large online settings), it is natural
to assume that some fraction of the players participating in an advertising auction might have unsophisticated
bidding strategies. In fact, some players may not even play at equilibrium in the single-shot approximation
of the GSP auction, or may only be able to find strategies that are approximately utility-maximizing. We
discuss the robustness of our bounds to the presence of players bidding with limited (or no) rationality. As
we shall see, the GSP auction has the property that its social welfare guarantees degrade continuously when
our assumptions about the rationality of the players are relaxed.
1.1 Our results
We present the following results.
• Our main result is a bound on the Bayesian price of anarchy for the GSP auction. Specifically, we
show that the price of anarchy is at most 2.927, meaning that the social welfare in any Bayes-Nash
equilibrium is at least 1/2.927 of the optimal social welfare. Notice that this is an unconditional
bound, as we make no assumptions on the distribution on valuation profiles and quality factors (it
can, for example, be correlated) or on the number of players or slots. In the main part of the paper,
we prove weaker bounds for both the full information and the Bayesian game, and only sketch the
stronger bounds. We believe that the weaker bounds are interesting in their own right, and show the
main techniques of the paper in a way that is easier to read. We defer the details of the stronger bounds
to the Appendix.
Perhaps just as important as the bound, however, is the straightforward and robust nature of the GSP
auction. In particular, our results extend to provide the same welfare guarantees for outcomes of
no-regret learning: the average social welfare when players play repeatedly in order to minimize
total regret, in a Bayesian setting, is within a 1/2.927 factor of the optimal social welfare. In fact,
some of our bounds for learning outcomes require only that the players have no regret for a particular
natural strategy of shading their bids. The bounds continue to hold even if players have asymmetric
access to distributional information, in the form of exogenously provided signals. It also degrades
continuously in the presence of approximately rational players or a small fraction of irrational players
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as explained in Appendix D. The results also extend to the case when possible bid space is discretized
(i.e., players need to bid in integer number of pennies). This case is interesting both as in practice bids
do come from such a discrete space, and also as in the discrete case, the existence of Nash equilibria
is guaranteed. In fact, using a result of Athey [2] and Reny [30], in the discrete case if player types
and quality factors are drawn independently, one can also show that the existence of pure strategy
equilibria that are monotone in the types is guaranteed.
• We achieve the bounds on the solution quality by identifying a property that encapsulates some of
the insight. Roughgarden [31] identified a class of games that he termed smooth games, defined via
a similar property that is used to bound the price of anarchy. We identify a stronger property, semi-
smoothness, that is satisfied by the GSP auction, and is strong enough to also imply price of anarchy
bounds even in the Bayesian setting with arbitrarily correlated types.
• We provide improved results for the case where there is no uncertainty, which is the traditional setting
studied in [11, 36]. If valuations and quality factors are fixed, we prove that the social welfare in
any pure Nash equilibrium is within a factor of 1.282 of the optimal one and show that this bound is
essentially tight by providing a lower bound of 1.259. Also, we show a bound of 2.310 for coarse cor-
related equilibria; as discussed above, this implies the same bound on the social welfare for learning
outcomes when players with fixed (effective) types minimize their regret in a repeated auction. This
bound of 2.310 holds for mixed Nash equilibria as well.
1.2 Related work
Due to their central role in Internet monetization, sponsored search auctions have received considerable
attention in the past years. From the optimization perspective, they were first considered by Mehta et
al. [26]. A classical game-theoretical modeling of sponsored search auctions was proposed simultaneously
by Edelman et al. [11] and Varian [36]. See the surveys of Lahaie et al. [20] and Maille et al. [25] for an
overview of subsequent developments.
The model we adopt follows [11, 36]. In those two seminal papers, the authors notice that even though
truthtelling is not a dominant strategy under GSP, the full information game always has a Nash equilibrium
that has same allocation and payments as the VCG mechanism. They focus on a subclass of Nash equilibria
which is called envy-free equilibria in [11] and symmetric equilibria in [36]. They show that such equilibria
always exist and are always efficient. In this class, an advertiser would not be better off after switching
bids with the advertiser just above her. Note that this is a stronger requirement than in Nash equilibria,
which are defined considering only unilateral deviations by the advertisers, and if an advertiser unilaterally
switches to a slot with higher click-through-rate, she pays more than the advertiser at that slot paid. In
[11, 12, 36], informal arguments are presented to justify the selection of envy-free equilibria, but no formal
game-theoretical analysis is done. We believe it is an important question to go beyond this and prove
efficiency guarantees for all Nash equilibria. Lahaie [19] also considers the problem of bounding the social
welfare obtained at equilibrium, but restricts attention to the special case that click-through-rates decay
exponentially along the slots with a factor of 1δ . Under this assumption, Lahaie proves a price of anarchy of
min{1δ , 1− 1δ}.
Gomes and Sweeney [16] study the GSP auction in the Bayesian setting, where player types are drawn
from independent and identical distributions (without considering the uncertainty due to quality factors).
They show that, unlike the full information case, there may not exist symmetric or socially optimal equi-
libria in this model, and obtain sufficient conditions on click-through-rates that guarantee the existence of
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a symmetric and efficient equilibrium. Athey and Nekipelov [3] study the effect of uncertainty of quality
factors both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective.
The study of price of anarchy for non-truthful auction mechanisms (especially in the Bayesian setting)
was initiated by Christodoulou et al. [9] and developed in Lucier and Borodin [23], Lucier [22], and most
recently in the work of Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [5]. To the best of our knowledge, the current paper is
the first one in which the price of anarchy bounds hold when player valuations are drawn from a correlated
distribution. In truthful mechanism design, the study of correlated valuations has a long history – see Cremer
and McLean [10] for an early reference.
The study of regret-minimization goes back to the work of Hannan on repeated two-player games [17].
Since then, a number of simple algorithms (to be thought of as adaptive procedures) that guarantee no-regret
have been proposed in the literature. Initial work in this area focused on the stronger requirement of finding
simple adaptive procedures through which the play converges to the set of correlated equilibria, requiring
that players have a stronger form of no-regret that is called no internal regret (see the survey by Blum and
Mansour [7] for a discussion of such procedures and a comparison). Foster and Vohra [14] obtained such a
procedure, and Fudenberg and Levine [15] presented a different one. Hart and Mas-Collel’s regret matching
strategy [18] or the multiplicative weight updating strategy of [21] (see also [1]) are two procedures that
become especially simple when used to guarantee only no-regret (as opposed to no internal regret). These
classical learning algorithms assume that players learn outcomes and strategies of all participants in each
round, but have also been extended to situations where in each round, a player observes only her own
outcome, or even realizations of her outcome in case it is randomized. We refer to Auer et al. [4] for a
detailed discussion on this matter.
Adaptive procedures that guarantee no-regret define a play that converges to the set of coarse correlated
equilibria. Blum et al. [6] apply regret-minimization to the study of inefficiency in repeated games, coining
the term “price of total anarchy” for the worst-case ratio between the optimal objective value and the average
objective value when players minimize regret.
Roughgarden [31] identifies a class of games that he terms smooth games where the price of anarchy
and price of total anarchy are identical. See also [27] and [33], for subsequent refinements. Since the initial
conference versions of our Bayesian bound of [24] and [8], Roughgarden [32] and independently Syrgkanis
[34] show that the bounds proved via smoothness also extend to the Bayesian price of anarchy assuming
a variant of the smoothness assumption (called universal smoothness in [34]) if player types are drawn
from independent distributions. See [35] for such an extension theorem without the stronger assumption.
In this paper we isolate a stronger property related to smoothness that encapsulates many of the insights
that drive our bounds and allows us to extend our bounds for the Bayesian price of anarchy with correlated
distributions.
Some of the results in this paper appeared in preliminary conference versions. Paes Leme and Tardos
[29] study equilibria of GSP auctions and give upper bounds on the price of anarchy in pure, mixed, and
Bayesian strategies; achieving bounds of 1.618, 4, and 8, respectively. Lucier and Paes Leme [24] and
Caragiannis et al. [8] improve these bounds to 3.16 and 3.037 respectively for Bayesian games, and 1.282
and 2.31 for pure Nash and learning outcomes for full information games (as well as mixed Nash equilibria),
and extend them to apply to equilibria with correlated valuations and learning outcomes. Here we further
improve the bounds, present and also improve the proofs, and extend the results to games with uncertainty
about quality factors in addition to player types.
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2 Model and Equilibrium Concepts
We consider an auction with n advertisers and n slots1. Each advertiser i has a private type vi, representing
her valuation per click received. The sequence v = (v1, . . . , vn) is referred to as the type profile (or valuation
profile). We will write v−i for v excluding the ith entry, so that v = (vi,v−i).
An outcome is an assignment of advertisers to slots. An outcome can be viewed as a permutation π
with π(k) being the advertiser assigned to slot k. The probability of a click depends on the slot as well
as the advertiser shown in the slot. We use the model of separable click probabilities. We assume slots
have associated click-through-rates α1 ≥ α2 ≥ . . . ≥ αn, and each advertiser i has a quality factor γi that
reflects the clickability of the ad. When advertiser i is assigned to the k-th slot, she gets αkγi clicks.
A mechanism for this auction elicits a bid bi ∈ R+ := [0,∞) from each advertiser i, which is interpreted
as a type declaration, and returns an assignment as well as a price pi per click for each advertiser. If advertiser
i is assigned to slot j at a price of pi, her utility is αjγi(vi−pi), which is the number of clicks received times
profit per click. The social welfare of outcome π is SW (π,v, γ) =∑j αjγπ(j)vπ(j), the total value of the
solution for the participants. The social welfare also depends on the click-through-rates αj , but throughout
the paper we will assume they are fixed and common knowledge, and as a result we suppress them in the
notation. The optimal social welfare is OPT (v, γ) = maxπ SW (π,v, γ), the welfare generated by the
socially efficient outcome. Note that the efficient outcome sorts advertisers by their effective values γivi,
and assigns them to slots in this order. The effective value can be thought of as the expected value of showing
the ad in a slot with click-through-rate equal to 1.
We focus on a particular mechanism, the Generalized Second Price auction, which works as follows.
Given bid profile b, we define the effective bid of advertiser i to be γibi, which is her bid modified by her
quality factor, analogous to the effective value defined above. The auction sets π(k) to be the advertiser with
the kth highest effective bid (breaking ties arbitrarily). That is, the GSP mechanism assigns slots with higher
click-through-rate to advertisers with higher effective bids. Payments are then set according to critical value:
the smallest bid that guarantees the advertiser the same slot. When advertiser i is assigned to slot k (that is,
when π(k) = i), this critical value is defined as
pi =
γπ(k+1)
γi
bπ(k+1)
where we take bn+1 = 0. We will write ui(b, γ) for the utility derived by advertiser i from the GSP
mechanism when advertisers bid according to b:
ui(b, γ) = απ−1(i)γi(vi − pi) = απ−1(i)[γivi − γπ(π−1(i)+1)bπ(π−1(i)+1)].
Notice that π is a function of b, γ as well. In places where we need to be more explicit, we will write
π(b, γ, j) to be the advertiser assigned to slot j by GSP when quality factors are γ and the advertisers bid
according to b. We will also write σ(b, γ, i) for the slot assigned to advertiser i, again when advertisers bid
according to b and quality factors are γ. In other words, σ(b, γ, ·) = π−1(b, γ, ·). We write πi(b−i, γ, j)
to be the advertiser that would be assigned to slot j if advertiser i did not participate in the auction. When
b and γ are clear from the context, we write π(i) and σ(i) instead of π(b, γ, i) and σ(b, γ, i). We will also
write ν(v, γ) for the optimal assignment of slots to advertisers for valuation profile v, so that ν(v, γ, i) is
the slot that would be allocated to advertiser i in the optimal assignment2.
1We note that we can handle unequal numbers of slots and advertisers by adding virtual slots with click-through-rate zero or
virtual advertisers with zero valuation per click.
2We note that, since GSP makes the optimal assignment for a given bid declaration, we actually have that ν(v, γ, i) and
σ(v, γ, i) are identically equal. We define ν mainly for use when emphasizing the distinction between an efficient assignment for
a valuation profile and the assignment that results from a given bid profile.
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We will consider rational behavior under various models of the information available to the advertisers.
In general, the advertisers are engaged as players in a game defined by the auction mechanism; each of them
aims to select a bidding strategy that maximizes her utility. In the following, we use the terms advertiser
and player interchangeably. We group our models into full information and partial information ones. In all
models we assume that the values αj are fixed and commonly known to all players. In our full information
settings, we assume that the quality factors γi as well as the valuation profile v are also common knowledge.
In our Bayesian setting of partial information, we assume that the profile of quality factors is unknown to
all players, and the type vi is private knowledge known only to player i, but they are randomly drawn from
a commonly known joint distribution (F,G) of quality factors and valuation profiles. It will turn out that
bidding more than one’s true type (overbidding) is a dominated strategy in the mechanism we consider. So,
we will focus on non-overbidding (or conservative) players; see Section 2.3 for a discussion.
2.1 Full information setting
In the full information setting, the valuation profile v and quality factors γi are fixed and common knowl-
edge. We will therefore tend to drop dependencies on γ from our notation when working in the full infor-
mation setting. In this setting, a pure strategy for player i is a bid bi ∈ R+. We say that the bid profile b is
a (pure) Nash equilibrium if there is no deviation from which the player can profit, i.e., for all b′i ∈ R+,
ui(bi,b−i) ≥ ui(b′i,b−i).
It is known that a pure Nash equilibrium always exists in this setting [11, 36]. We can therefore define the
(pure) Price of Anarchy to be
sup
v,b∈NE
OPT (v)
SW (π(b),v)
where NE is the set of pure Nash equilibria (assuming no overbidding; see Section 2.3).
Similarly, a mixed strategy is a randomized bid bi, which is a distribution over possible bids. A mixed
Nash equilibrium is a profile of bid distributions b such that for all i and all alternative strategies b′i,
Eb[ui(bi,b−i))] ≥ Eb[ui(b′i,b−i))].
Note that, unlike more general solution concepts we will discuss in a while, the bid distributions of different
players at a mixed Nash equilibrium are independent. We define the (mixed) Price of Anarchy to be the
worst-case ratio between optimal social welfare and expected social welfare in GSP across all valuation
profiles and all mixed Nash equilibria:
sup
v,b∈NE
OPT (v)
Eb[SW (π(b),v)]
.
2.2 Bayesian setting
In the Bayesian setting of partial information, we suppose that the valuation profile and the quality factors
are drawn from a publicly known (possibly correlated) joint distribution (F,G). A strategy for player i is a
(possibly randomized) mapping bi : R+ → R+, mapping her type vi to a bid bi(vi). Notice that a player is
not able to condition her bid on the quality factors, since they are only known to the search engine, and not
to the advertisers.
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We write b(v) = (b1(v1), . . . , bn(vn)) to denote the profile of bids that results when b is applied to type
profile v. We then say that strategy profile b is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium for distributions F,G if, for all i,
all vi, and all alternative strategies b′i,
Ev−i,γ,b[ui(bi(vi),b−i(v−i), γ)|vi] ≥ Ev−i,γ,b[ui(b′i(vi),b−i(v−i), γ)|vi].
That is, each player maximizes her expected utility by bidding in accordance with strategy bi(·), assuming
that the other players bid in accordance with strategies b−i(·), where expectation is taken over the distribu-
tion of the other players’ types conditioned on vi, any randomness in their strategies, and the quality factors.
We define the Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy to be
sup
F,G,b(·)∈BNE
Ev,γ[OPT (v, γ)]
Ev,γ,b(v)[SW (π(b(v), γ),v, γ)]
where BNE is the set of all Bayes-Nash equilibria (again assuming no overbidding; see below).
2.3 No overbidding
It is important to note that, in both the full information and Bayesian settings, any bid bi > vi is dominated
by the bid bi = vi in the GSP auction. If by bidding bi > vi, the next highest effective bid is greater than
γivi, then the player gets negative utility. If on the other hand, the next highest effective bid is smaller or
equal than γivi, then bidding bi = vi would get the same slot and payment. Based on this, we make the
following assumption for the rest of the paper:
Assumption: Players are conservative and do not employ overbidding strategies in GSP auctions. This
means that for pure strategies bi ≤ vi, for mixed strategies P(bi > vi) = 0, and for Bayesian strategies
P(bi(vi) > vi) = 0 for all vi.
We use this assumption to rule out unnatural equilibria in which advertisers apply certain dominated
strategies. We remark that, in these equilibria, the social welfare may be arbitrarily worse than the optimal.
It is therefore necessary to exclude such dominated strategies in order to obtain meaningful bounds on the
price of anarchy. We note, however, that this phenomenon is not specific to the GSP auction: such degenerate
equilibria exist even in the Vickrey auction for a single good, where truthful bidding is a weakly dominant
strategy. Since the Vickrey auction is a special case of GSP auctions (where one slot has α1 = 1, all other
slots have αi = 0 and all quality factors have γi = 1), this issue carries over to our setting. Consider the
example of a single-item Vickrey auction, where truthful bidding of bi = vi is a weakly dominant strategy.
Yet with overbidding, there are equilibria where an arbitrary player bids excessively high (and hence wins),
while everyone else bids 0. If the player bidding high has a low valuation, this results in a high price
of anarchy. Note, however, that this Nash equilibrium seems very artificial as it depends crucially on the
low valuation player using the dominated strategy of overbidding. Indeed, such an advertiser is exposed
to the risk of negative utility (if some other advertiser submits a new bid between her valuation and bid)
without any benefit. We therefore take the position that advertisers will avoid such dominated strategies
when participating in the GSP auction.
2.4 Signals and information asymmetry
We define an extension of the setting above, incorporating a Bayesian version of information asymmetry. In
this model, each player’s type consists of a signal si drawn from an arbitrary signal space S. The signal of
10
player i includes her valuation vi(si) and can contain other privately-gained insight that refines the player
i’s conditional distribution over the space of other players’ types and quality factors. The signals and quality
factors come from a publicly known joint distribution (F′,G), which can be arbitrarily correlated.
In this model, a strategy is a bidding function that maps si, a signal, to a distribution of possible bids.
The bid profile b is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the asymmetric information model if, for all i and all
alternative bidding functions bi′,
Es−i,γ,b[ui(bi(si),b−i(s−i), γ)|si] ≥ Es−i,γ,b[ui(b′i(si),b−i(s−i), γ)|si]
In this model, the Price of Anarchy is defined as
sup
F′,G,b(·)∈BNE
Es,γ [OPT (v(s), γ)]
Es,γ,b(s)[SW (π(b(s), γ),v(s), γ)]
where BNE is the set of Bayes-Nash equilibria with respect to distribution F′ over signals, with no overbid-
ding.
The presence of signals captures the notion that some advertisers might have a better potential to infer
the other advertisers’ valuations than others, or may be endowed with privileged information. We do note,
however, that players do know their own valuations vi(si), and also are aware of the profile of bidding
strategies b(·) and the distribution F′, so that players can rationalize about the effects of signals upon the
bidding behavior of their opponents.
2.5 Repeated auctions and regret minimization
We now consider the GSP auction in a repeated-game setting. In this model, the GSP auction is run T ≥ 1
times. We will distinguish between two variants of this model: the full information model and the model
with uncertainty.
Full information model. Each round of the GSP auction occurs with the same slots and players. The
valuation profile v of the players and the quality factors do not change between rounds, but the players are
free to change their bids. We write bti for the bid of player i on round t. We refer to a D = (b1, . . . ,bT , . . .)
as an (infinite) declaration sequence. Given declaration sequence D, we will write DT to mean the prefix of
D of length T ; that is, DT = (b1, . . . ,bT ). Given a (finite or infinite) declaration sequence D, we will write
π(D) for the sequence of permutations generated by GSP on input D. The average social welfare generated
by GSP on a finite input sequence DT of length T is SW (π(DT ),v) = 1T
∑T
t=1 SW (π(b
t),v). The aver-
age social welfare generated by GSP on an infinite input sequence D is then defined to be SW (π(D),v) =
lim infT→∞ SW (π(DT ),v).
The full range of equilibria in such a repeated game is very rich, so we restrict ourselves to a particular
non-equilibrium form of play that nevertheless captures the intuition that players learn appropriate bidding
strategies over time, without necessitating convergence to a stationary equilibrium.
We say that declaration sequence D = (b1, . . . ,bT , . . .) minimizes external regret for player i if, for
any fixed declaration b′i, ∑
t≤T
ui(b
t
i,b
t
−i) ≥
∑
t≤T
ui(b
′
i,b
t
−i) +R(T )
where R(T )/T → 0 as T grows large. That is, as T grows large, the utility of player i in the limit is
no worse than the utility of the optimal fixed strategy in hindsight. The Price of Total Anarchy [6] is the
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worst-case ratio between optimal social welfare and the average social welfare obtained by GSP across all
declaration sequences that minimize external regret for all players. That is, the price of total anarchy is
sup
v,D
OPT (v)
SW (π(D),v)
where the supremum is taken over (infinite) declaration sequences that minimize external regret for all
players.
To this point we have not discussed how the players achieve vanishing regret, and indeed our results
are agnostic to this process. There are many known learning algorithms that guarantee vanishing regret
as T goes to infinity. These algorithms require only that a player observes her realized payoff after each
round. That is, to facilitate learning it is enough if players see whether or not their ad was clicked and, if
so, the price of the click. In particular, they do not need to learn outcomes or bids of other players, nor
even the actual slot their ad was placed in. For an extensive discussion on no-regret algorithms with limited
feedback, we refer to Auer et al. [4]. Further, it is known that the price of total anarchy is closely related
to an equilibrium notion for the single-shot game known as coarse correlated equilibrium. We discuss this
relationship further in Section 5.1.
Learning with uncertainty. Next we describe our model of learning in repeated GSP auctions with un-
certainty. In this model, each round of the GSP auction occurs with the same slots, but the valuation profile
v and quality factors γ are redrawn from (F,G) on each round3. These changes to ad quality and types
can be thought of as being due to the context of the search query that initiates each auction instance, which
can change between rounds. As before, learning requires only that players observe their own outcome each
round, and not the results for other players. I.e., a player learns whether or not her ad was clicked, and if so
the price per click, but does not necessarily observe the outcomes or bids of other players nor the realization
of γ. We again refer to Auer et al. [4] for a discussion of no-regret algorithms with limited feedback.
Suppose that each player has a finite type space4. Let vt, γt be the type profile and quality factors drawn
at round t. Given a declaration sequence D and type v˜i for player i, we denote by I(i, v˜i) the subsequence of
D consisting of the set of rounds in which player i has type v˜i, i.e., I(i, v˜i) = {t; vti = v˜i}. Define IT (i, v˜i)
analogously with respect to DT . Given a sequence of type profiles and quality factors that represent the
realization of these random quantities over the rounds of the auction, we say that player i has vanishing
regret in declaration sequence D if player i has vanishing regret (in the sense of the full information game)
on the subsequence I(i, v˜i) of D for each possible type v˜i. Formally:∑
t∈IT (i,v˜i)
ui(b
t
i,b
t
−i, γ
t) ≥
∑
t∈IT (i,v˜i)
ui(b
′
i,b
t
−i, γ
t) +R(|IT (i, v˜i)|)
for R(T )/T → 0 as T →∞. Notice that since vt is independently and identically distributed in each round,
we have |IT (i, v˜i)| → ∞ as T →∞. Now, we can define the Price of Total Anarchy with uncertainty as:
sup
{vt},{γt},D
lim sup
T→∞
∑
t≤T OPT (v
t, γt)∑
t≤T SW (π(bt, γt),vt, γt)
.
As in the full information setting, there is a relationship between regret minimization under uncertainty
and coarse correlated equilibria with uncertainty. Note however, that the speed of learning now depends on
3In fact, we can also think of the set of players as changing on each round: if player i is assigned type 0 on a given round, this
can be interpreted as player i not being present in that round.
4For instance, one could assume that valuations are bounded and multiples of some arbitrarily small increment.
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the time needed for the empirical distribution of iid samples (vt, γt) to resemble the original distribution
and for learning algorithms to guarantee low regret with high probability. We discuss this in more detail in
Section 5.2.
3 Semi-Smooth Games and the Price of Anarchy with Uncertainty
Our main result is a bound on the price of anarchy for the Generalized Second Price auction with uncertainty.
Recall that our model captures two types of uncertainty: uncertainty for player types and uncertainty about
quality factors. Further, our result holds even in the presence of information asymmetry in the form of
personalized signals available to the players.5 For simplicity of presentation, we focus on the setting where
there are no signals and player valuations and quality factors are drawn from a known joint distribution
(F,G).
Theorem 3.1 The price of anarchy of the Generalized Second Price auction with uncertainty is at most
2.927. That is, for any fixed click-through-rates α1, . . . , αn, any joint distribution (F,G) over valuation
profiles and quality factors, and any Bayes-Nash equilibrium b,
Ev,γ,b[SW (π(b, γ),v, γ)] ≥ 1
2.927
Ev,γ[OPT (v, γ)].
Semi-smooth games and the price of anarchy. Our proof is based on an extension of a proof technique
introduced by Roughgarden [31], which he calls smoothness. We begin by reviewing this notion briefly in
the context of a general game. Let t denote the (fixed) player types in a game, and h a pure strategy profile
for the players, and let Ui(t,h) denote the utility of player i with player types t, and strategy profile h. Let
sw(t,h) denote the social welfare generated by strategy profile h, and sw∗(t) the maximum possible social
welfare. Roughgarden defines (λ, µ)-smooth games as games where for all pairs of pure strategy profiles
h,h′, and any (fixed) vector of types t, we have∑
i
Ui(t, h
′
i,h−i) ≥ λ · sw(t,h′)− µ · sw(t,h).
Roughly speaking, smoothness captures the property that if strategy profile h′ results in a significantly
larger social welfare than another strategy profile h, then a large part of this gap in welfare is captured by
the marginal increases in the utility of each individual player when unilaterally switching her strategy from
hi to h′i.
It is not hard to see that GSP does not satisfy this definition for all pairs of strategy profiles h,h′.
However, we argue that GSP is smooth with respect to a particular (possibly randomized) strategy profile
h
′
, as defined by Nadav and Roughgarden [27], that can be used by players unilaterally to improve the
efficiency of GSP whenever its allocation resulting from a pure strategy profile h is highly inefficient. Note
that unlike [27] we require improvement relative to the social optimum sw∗(t) and not relative to sw(t,h′),
i.e., we will not assume that sw(t,h′) is (close to) the maximum sw∗(t). Further, we will show that there
exists such a strategy profile h′ where the strategy h′i of a player depends only on the type of the player. We
call games that satisfy this stronger requirement semi-smooth.
5In the presence of additional signals, we can assume that signal s also encodes the valuation of the player, i.e., that player i’s
valuation for a click when she receives signal si is vi(si), and in this case, signals and quality factors are drawn from a known joint
distribution (F′,G). Our statement and proof carry over to this case with straightforward modifications.
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Definition 3.2 (semi-smooth games) We say that a game is (λ, µ)-semi-smooth if for each player i there
exists some (possibly randomized) strategy h′i(·) (depending only on the type of the player) such that,∑
i
Eh′
i
(ti)[Ui(t, h
′
i(ti),h−i)] ≥ λ · sw∗(t)− µ · sw(t,h),
for every pure strategy profile h and every (fixed) type vector t. The expectation is taken over the random
bits of h′i(ti).
Analogous to Roughgarden’s [31] proof (see also Nadav and Roughgarden [27]), semi-smoothness also
immediately implies a bound on the price of anarchy with uncertainty even when the types are arbitrarily
correlated.
Lemma 3.3 If a game is (λ, µ)-semi-smooth and its social welfare is at least the sum of the players’ utilities,
then the price of anarchy with uncertainty (and information asymmetries) is at most (µ + 1)/λ.
Proof. Consider a game in the Bayesian setting where player types are drawn from a joint probability
distribution and let h be a Bayes-Nash equilibrium for this game. By the definition of the Bayes-Nash
equilibrium, we have that Et−i,h[Ui(t,h)|ti] ≥ Et−i,h[Ui(t, h′i(ti),h−i)|ti] for every value the random
variable h′i(ti) may take. Hence, Et−i,h[Ui(t,h)|ti] ≥ Et−i,hEh′i(ti)[Ui(t, h′i(ti),h−i)|ti]. Now taking
expectation over ti, we get Et,h[Ui(t,h)] ≥ Et,hEh′
i
(ti)[Ui(t, h
′
i(ti),h−i)]. By summing over all players,
and using the fact that the social welfare is at least the sum of the players’ utilities, as well as the semi-
smoothness property, we have
Et,h[sw(t,h)] ≥ Et,h[
∑
i
Ui(t,h)]
≥ Et,h[
∑
i
Eh′
i
(ti)[Ui(t, h
′
i(ti),h−i)]]
≥ Et,h[λ · sw∗(t)− µ · sw(t,h)]
= λEt[sw
∗(t)]− µEt,h[sw(t,h)].
Note that the third inequality follows by applying the semi-smoothness property for every fixed type vector
and every pure strategy profile that are simultaneous outcomes of the random vectors t and h. The last
inequality implies Et[sw∗(t)] ≤ µ+1λ Et,h[sw(t,h)], as claimed.
We remark that the proof holds without significant changes if we add information asymmetries in the
game, i.e., if we assume that each player gets signals that reveal her type and refine her knowledge on the
probability distributions of the types of the other players. The only change required is to define an extended
type for each player, consisting of the player’s original type composed with that player’s signal, and use it
in place of the original type.
A particular strength of Lemma 3.3 lies in the fact that it can provide bounds on the efficiency loss for
Bayesian games even with correlated types (and, as we will see later in Section 5, under even more general
equilibrium concepts) by examining substantially more restricted settings. In the context of GSP auction
games, it allows us to focus on identifying a (possibly randomized) deviating bid strategy for each player
(i.e., a bid b′i for each player i) so that the semi-smoothness inequality holds for every fixed valuation vector
v and pure bidding profile b. By Lemma 3.3, this then immediately implies a bound on the price of anarchy
of GSP auction games with uncertainty and information asymmetries.
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Remark 3.4 It is maybe easier to interpret a deterministic special case of Lemma 3.3 where we require that
Definition 3.2 holds for deterministic bids h′i(·). As a warmup in analyzing the GSP auction, we will show
in Claim 3.6 that the bids b′i = 12vi can serve to prove that the GSP auction is (1/2, 1)-smooth, and hence
has a price of anarchy of at most 4. This bound of 4 on the price of anarchy shows that if the social welfare
is less than a quarter of the maximum possible, there is a player i who can deviate to b′i = 12vi, a natural
shading of her bid, and improve her utility.
To improve the bound we will consider a deviating bid bi = θ · vi for other constants θ ∈ (0, 1). In fact,
we will need to consider a random θ rather than a constant one. There are two ways to understand such a
random bid: a direct conclusion is that sampling θ according to the prescribed distribution produces a good
deviation in expectation, whenever welfare is low. But maybe a more natural interpretation is through the
lenses of the probabilistic method, used in combinatorics to show that a certain object exists without finding
it explicitly. If there exists a randomized deviation bi = θ · vi that improves player i’s utility, this implies
that there exists a deterministic bid θvi that improves player i’s utility.
The randomization on selecting the bid h′i(·) in Definition 3.2 gives us more flexibility to prove the
semi-smoothness inequality with good parameters λ and µ by defining appropriately the density function of
h′i’s.
Price of anarchy of GSP auctions. First note that, technically speaking, the GSP auction does not im-
mediately fit into the framework of semi-smoothness: advertiser payoffs depend on random quality factors
which may be correlated with the type profile. However, this notational technicality is easily addressed by
expressing advertiser utilities in expectation over quality scores. That is, expressing utilities in the GSP auc-
tion in the notation of general games, we have Ui(v,b) = Eγ [ui(b, γ)|v]. Since quality factors affect the
social welfare as well, we have sw∗(v) = Eγ [OPT (v, γ)|v] and sw(v,b) = Eγ [SW (π(b, γ),v, γ)|v].
We are ready to prove that GSP auction games are semi-smooth. We start by presenting a slightly weaker
version of Theorem 3.1, where we prove a bound of 3.164. Then we sketch the proof of the improved bound
of 2.927, which is more technically involved. Details of the proof can be found in Appendix A.
Lemma 3.5 The GSP auction game is (1− 1e , 1)-semi-smooth.
Proof. We begin by rewriting the definition of semi-smoothness in the notation of GSP auctions. The GSP
auction game is (1 − 1e , 1)-semi-smooth if and only if, for each valuation profile v, there exists a (possibly
randomized) bid profile b′ (with b′i depending only on the valuation of player i) such that, for every bid
profile b,
∑
i
Eγ,b′
i
[ui(b
′
i,b−i, γ)|v] ≥
(
1− 1
e
)
Eγ [OPT (v, γ)|v] − Eγ [SW (π(b, γ),v, γ)|v]. (1)
We will actually establish the stronger property that this inequality holds for all γ, and not only in expecta-
tion. ∑
i
Eb′
i
[ui(b
′
i,b−i, γ)] ≥
(
1− 1
e
)
OPT (v, γ) − SW (π(b, γ),v, γ). (2)
The desired inequality (1) will then follow by taking (2) in expectation over the choice of γ (whose distri-
bution may depend on the valuation profile v).
Before establishing inequality (2), we will prove the even weaker statement that the GSP auction game
is (1/2, 1)-semi-smooth (which implies a bound of 4 on the price of anarchy with uncertainty).
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Claim 3.6 The GSP auction game is (1/2, 1)-semi-smooth.
Proof. Choose a vector v of fixed valuations, a pure bidding profile b, and quality factors γ. Consider a
(deterministic) deviating bid b′i = vi/2 for each player i. We distinguish between two cases (recalling that
ν(i) is the slot assigned to player i in the efficient allocation given v and γ):
• If by bidding b′i player i gets slot ν(i) or better, then ui(b′i,b−i, γ) ≥ αν(i)γivi/2, as the payment pi
cannot exceed her effective bid.
• If by bidding b′i player i gets a slot lower than ν(i), then the effective value of the player π(ν(i)) in
slot ν(i) is at least γivi/2, as we assume no overbidding.
We conclude that, in either case,
ui(b
′
i,b−i, γ) ≥ αν(i)γivi/2− αν(i)γπ(ν(i))vπ(ν(i)).
Summing over all players, and noticing that
∑
i αiγπ(i)vπ(i) = SW (π(b, γ),v, γ), while
∑
i αν(i)γivi =
OPT (v, γ), we arrive at the claimed bound that the GSP auction game is (1/2, 1)-semi-smooth:∑
i
ui(b
′
i,b−i, γ) ≥
1
2
OPT (v, γ) − SW (π(b, γ),v, γ).
Notice that the proof uses a single Nash inequality: that no player i would be better off changing her
bid to b′i = vi/2, bidding half her valuation, a natural shading of her valuation. As we will see in Section 5,
the bound will also apply to learning outcomes under the same assumption of not regretting this single
alternative.
Now we return to proving the (1 − 1e , 1) semi-smoothness. To do this, consider a randomized bid b′,
rather than the deterministic bid of b′i = vi/2 considered above, that offers a more sophisticated bid-shading
strategy. We consider a random strategy where player i shades her bid randomly to a value in the interval
[0, vi(1 − 1e )], where bid b′i is a random variable with density f(y) = 1vi−y for y ∈ [0, vi(1 −
1
e )] and
f(y) = 0 otherwise. We will show that
Eb′
i
[ui(b
′
i,b−i, γ)] ≥
(
1− 1
e
)
αν(i)γivi − αν(i)γπ(ν(i))bπ(ν(i)). (3)
Like in the proof of Claim 3.6, by summing expression (3) for all i and using the fact that bπ(i) ≤ vπ(i) by
the non-overbidding assumption, we obtain that the game is (1− 1e , 1)-semi-smooth.
It remains to derive equation (3). We have that
Eb′
i
[ui(b
′
i,b−i, γ)] ≥ Eb′i [αν(i)γi(vi − b
′
i)1{γib′i ≥ γπ(ν(i))bπ(ν(i))}]
=
∫ vi(1− 1e )
0
αν(i)γi(vi − y)1{γiy ≥ γπ(ν(i))bπ(ν(i))}
1
vi − ydy
= αν(i)γi
[
vi
(
1− 1
e
)
− γπ(ν(i))
γi
bπ(ν(i))
]+
≥
(
1− 1
e
)
αν(i)γivi − αν(i)γπ(ν(i))bπ(ν(i))
which implies (3), completing the proof of Lemma 3.5.
Combining Lemmas 3.3 and 3.5, we get the claimed bound on the price of anarchy.
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Theorem 3.7 The price of anarchy of the Generalized Second Price auction with uncertainty (and with
information asymmetries) is at most 2(1− 1/e)−1 ≈ 3.164.
To prove Theorem 3.1 we will need to extend semi-smoothness specially tailored to the GSP auction
game. In addition to working more carefully on optimizing constants, we want to highlight two ideas: First,
note that the payment of the player in slot i is αiγπ(i+1)bπ(i+1), and this payment also contributes to the
social welfare. Using that α is monotone decreasing, we can add a term αiγπ(i)bπ(i) to social welfare (in
addition to the advertisers’ utility) for all slots except the top one. Second, the player in the top slot can
obtain a stronger bound on her utility by considering the deviation b′1 = v1. (For all other players bidding
too close to vi endangers getting a higher slot at too high a price, but the top player does not face this danger.)
We will use these ideas in Section 5 to improve our bound on the learning outcomes for full information
games. The details of the more complicated improved bound for the Bayesian case are found in Appendix
A.
Discretization of the bidding space. Analogous results also hold when the possible bid space is dis-
cretized (i.e., players need to bid in integer number of pennies). With a finely enough discretized bid space,
the players could approximately follow the bidding strategies used in the above proofs, as well as in the
proofs in Appendix A. The Nash property then implies that the same bound holds at the equilibria with a
small loss due to the discretization. Recall that this case is both of practical relevance, and using a result of
Athey [2] and Reny [30], in the discrete case if player types and quality factors are drawn independently, the
existence of pure strategy equilibria that are monotone in the types is also guaranteed.
In order to illustrate this point, we show how to adapt Lemma 3.5 and Theorem 3.7 to the case where
possible bids are discrete. Assume bids bi must be in the finite set Tǫ,K = {0, ǫ, 2ǫ, . . . ,Kǫ} for some large
integer K . We also need to assume that ǫ is small compared to the valuations. We will assume that ǫ < 1e
and all types in the support of the distribution are vi ≥ 1. We show that:
Lemma 3.8 The GSP auction game with discretized bid is ((1− 1e )(1− eǫ), 1− eǫ)-semi-smooth assuming
ǫ < 1e and vi ≥ 1 for all i. That is, there is a deviation b′i from the discrete space Tǫ,K that satisfies the
semi-smoothness inequality.
Proof. The proof follows from a small modification of Lemma 3.5. There we considered the deviation
where a player with valuation vi samples a bid b′i from the distribution with density f(y) = 1vi−y for
y ∈ [0, (1 − 1e )vi]. In this setting, bids must lie in Tǫ,K , so we use a rounded version instead: bˆ′i = ǫ · ⌈yǫ ⌉.
This change increases the probability that γibˆ′i ≥ γπ(ν(i))bπ(ν(i)), but decreases the expression vi − b′i inside
the integral. This decrease, however, is bounded since it holds that
min
y
vi − ǫ · ⌈yǫ ⌉
vi − y ≥ (1−
ǫe
vi
) ≥ 1− ǫe.
Using the same calculation as in the proof of Lemma 3.5, we get that
Ebˆ′
i
[ui(bˆ
′
i,b−i, γ)] ≥ (1− ǫe)
(
1− 1
e
)
αν(i)γivi − (1− ǫe)αν(i)γπ(ν(i))bπ(ν(i)).
Using this Lemma 3.8 we immediately get the following theorem.
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Theorem 3.9 The price of anarchy of the Generalized Second Price auction with uncertainty and discretized
bids is at most (1 + 11−ǫe) · (1− 1e )−1 = 3.16 +O(ǫ), assuming that bids lie on Tǫ,K = {0, ǫ, 2ǫ, . . . ,Kǫ},
for a large integer K and ǫ < 1/e, and that, for each player i, vi ≥ 1.
4 Pure Nash Equilibria in the Full Information Setting
In this section we turn our attention to the full information setting, where the quality factors γ are fixed and
common knowledge. Without loss of generality we can assume that γ1v1 ≥ γ2v2 ≥ . . . ≥ γnvn. In this
setting the strategy of a player is a single bid bi ∈ [0, vi], again assuming that players do not overbid. Our
main result in this setting is the following:
Theorem 4.1 The (pure) price of anarchy of the Generalized Second Price auction in the full information
setting is at most 1.282. In other words, for any fixed click-through-rates α, valuation profile v, and quality
factors γ, if b is a bid profile in pure Nash equilibrium, then SW (π(b),v) ≥ 11.282 · OPT (v) ≈ 0.78 ·
OPT (v).
The bound above is very close to being tight, since we can exhibit an example with 3 players and 3 slots
for which there is an equilibrium where the gap between the optimal social welfare and the social welfare in
equilibrium is 1.259. Also, we can show the following slightly stronger bound for a small number of players
and slots. Notice however that the bound in Theorem 4.1 holds regardless of the number of slots.
Theorem 4.2 For 2 players and 2 slots, the price of anarchy is exactly 1.25. For 3 players and 3 slots, the
price of anarchy is exactly 1.259. By exactly we mean that there is a particular GSP auction game with an
equilibrium matching this bound.
Proof. Here we give an example with two slots that yields price of anarchy 1.25. In Appendix B, we show
that this is worst possible, and show the bound for 3 slots.
For two slots, consider an example with two players with valuations 1 and 1/2 respectively, quality
factors γ1 = γ2 = 1, and two slots with α1 = 1 and α2 = 1/2. The bids b1 = 0 and b2 = 1/2 are at
equilibrium, resulting in a social welfare of 1, while the optimal social welfare is 1.25.
The full proof of Theorem 4.1 can be found in Appendix B. Here instead, we present the proof of a
weaker bound that highlights the intuition underlying our result that GSP equilibria have good social welfare
properties.
Theorem 4.3 The (pure) price of anarchy of the Generalized Second Price auction in the full information
setting is at most 2.
The proof is based on the concept of weakly feasible allocations. Recall that each bid profile b defines
an allocation π that is a mapping from slots to players π : [n]→ [n].
Definition 4.4 (weakly feasible allocations) We say that an allocation π is weakly feasible if the following
holds for each pair i, j of slots:
αj
αi
+
γπ(i)vπ(i)
γπ(j)vπ(j)
≥ 1. (4)
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We also use the term weak feasibility condition to refer to inequality (4).
The concept of weakly feasible allocations is a relaxation of the concept of Nash equilibrium. We adopt
this terminology to denote it is a weakening of the feasibility conditions for Nash equilibrium. This concept
encapsulates the fact that an allocation in equilibrium cannot be too far from the optimal. The optimal
allocation is such that π(i) = i, since both {αi} and {γivi} are sorted. If an allocation is not optimal, then
two slots i < j have advertisers assigned to them such that π(i) > π(j), i.e., they are assigned in the wrong
order. Equation (4) implies that at least one of the two ratios is at least 1/2, and hence whenever advertisers
are assigned in the non-optimal order, then either (i) the two advertisers have similar effective values for a
click, or (ii) the click-through-rates of the two slots are not very different; in either case their relative order
does not affect the social welfare very much.
Lemma 4.5 If b is a Nash equilibrium of the GSP auction game, then the induced allocation π satisfies the
weak feasibility condition.
Proof. If j ≤ i the inequality is obviously true. Otherwise consider the player π(j) in slot j. Since b is a
Nash equilibrium, the player in slot j is happy with her outcome and does not want to increase her bid to take
slot i, so: αj(γπ(j)vπ(j) − γπ(j+1)bπ(j+1)) ≥ αi(γπ(j)vπ(j)− γπ(i)bπ(i)) since bπ(j+1) ≥ 0 and bπ(i) ≤ vπ(i)
then: αjγπ(j)vπ(j) ≥ αi(γπ(j)vπ(j) − γπ(i)vπ(i)).
Given Lemma 4.5, the proof of Theorem 4.3 follows almost directly:
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Taking j = σ(i) in the definition of weakly feasible allocations, we get that:
ασ(i)γivi + αiγπ(i)vπ(i) ≥ αiγivi. Now, summing this for each player i, we get
2 · SW (π(b),v) =
∑
i
ασ(i)γivi +
∑
i
αiγπ(i)vπ(i) ≥
∑
i
αiγivi = OPT (v).
To prove Theorem 4.1 we proceed by induction on the number of slots. Given an allocation π, consider
the directed graph G(π) that has one node for each slot, and a directed edge for each advertiser i that connects
the node corresponding to slot i to the node corresponding to slot π−1(i). When the allocation is optimal,
this graph consists of self-loops. In general, G(π) consists of a set of disjoint cycles, however, without loss
of generality, we can assume G(π) is a single cycle. We obtain the improved bound by considering four
nodes in the neighborhood of node 1 in this cycle, and separately considering cases depending on the order
of the effective values of the corresponding players. The details of the proof can be found in Appendix B.
5 Quality of Learning Outcomes in GSP
In this section, we bound the average quality of outcomes in a repeated play of a GSP auction game where
players employ strategies that guarantee no external regret. In both the full information setting and the setting
with uncertainty, we can reduce the problem over declaration sequences to a problem over distributions. This
will allow us to adapt our earlier bounds on the price of anarchy from Sections 3 and 4 to bound the price
of total anarchy. As in previous sections, we show simple and intuitive bounds in this section, and defer
improved and more complex bounds to the appendix.
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5.1 Learning in the full information setting
We will first focus upon the full information setting of the GSP auction. Recall that, in this model, the
valuation profile v and quality factors γ are fixed and common knowledge. As in the previous section, we
will assume that γ1v1 ≥ γ2v2 ≥ . . . ≥ γnvn.
We will begin by proving a relationship between the price of total anarchy and the set of coarse corre-
lated equilibria for the GSP auction in the full information model. Given a valuation profile v, a distribution
D over bid profiles is called a coarse correlated equilibrium if
Eb∼D[ui(b)] ≥ Eb∼D[ui(b′i,b−i)],∀i, b′i.
As we shall show, the price of total anarchy can be bounded by considering the social welfare generated at
any coarse correlated equilibrium.
Lemma 5.1 The price of total anarchy in the full information setting is at most
sup
v,D∈CCE
OPT (v)
Eb∼D[SW (π(b),v)]
where CCE is the set of coarse correlated equilibria.
Proof. Consider a declaration sequence D = (b1, . . . ,bt, . . .) in the full information case. For each T let
D
T be the distribution over bid profiles where each bt for t ≤ T is drawn with probability 1T . Proving that
the price of total anarchy is bounded by η is equivalent to showing that:
lim inf
T
Eb∼DT [SW (π(b),v)] ≥
1
η
OPT (v).
Since the set of all possible bid profiles is compact, one needs to prove that for all distributions D such that
there is a subsequence of {DT }T converging in distribution to D we have:
Eb∼D[SW (π(b),v)] ≥ 1
η
OPT (v).
It is therefore sufficient to show that such a D is a coarse correlated equilibrium. We note that the fact that
the declaration sequence D minimizes external regret implies that, for each distribution D which can be
written as the limit of a subsequence of {DT }T , it holds that:
Eb∼D[ui(b)] ≥ Eb∼D[ui(b′i,b−i)],∀i, b′i
as required.
Using this connection to coarse correlated equilibria, we are able to obtain a bound of 2.310 on the price
of total anarchy of the GSP auction.
Theorem 5.2 The price of total anarchy of the Generalized Second Price auction in the full information
setting is at most 2.310.
A full proof of Theorem 5.2 appears in Appendix C. We now present a simpler proof of the following
weaker bound, which captures some of the intuition behind the proof of Theorem 5.2.
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Theorem 5.3 The price of total anarchy of the Generalized Second Price auction in the full information
setting is at most 3.
Proof. The proof can be thought of as an improved version of the price of anarchy bound based on the
fact that the GSP auction game is (1/2, 1)-semi-smooth. We consider a distribution D which corresponds
to a coarse correlated equilibrium. All expectations in the following are taken with respect to b ∼ D.
Recall the outline of the bound of 4 on the price of anarchy based on the fact that the GSP auction game is
(1/2, 1)-semi-smooth. We considered a possible deviation for player i with valuation vi to bid b′i = vi/2,
and concluded the bound ui(b′i,b−i) ≥ αiγivi/2 − αiγπ(i)bπ(i) in the proof of Lemma 3.5. We use the
no-regret inequality directly, to get that
E[ui(b)] ≥ αiγivi/2− E[αiγπ(i)bπ(i)].
Using that bπ(i) ≤ vπ(i), and summing over all players we get a bound of 4 on the price of total anarchy as
was done in Lemma 3.3.
Here we improve this bound by adding two new ideas. First, note that for all slots except the top one
αiγπ(i)bπ(i) is a lower bound to the payment of the player in slot i − 1. The social welfare is the sum of
player utilities and the payments. The inequality states that in expectation the utility of player i plus the
payment of the player in slot i− 1 is at least αiγivi/2, i.e., half of the social welfare contributed by player i
in the efficient solution. To turn this into a bound on social welfare, we need to handle player 1 differently,
as α1γπ(1)bπ(1) does not correspond to any payment.
The second observation is that for player 1 we can obtain a stronger bound on her utility by considering
the deviation b′1 = v1. For other players such a high bid would endanger them to get a slot much higher than
their slot in the optimum at a very high price. But player 1 already gets the best slot in the efficient solution.
Deviating to b′1 = v1 will give the player the top slot, and hence utility α1γ1v1 − α1γπ(1)bπ(1). Now using
the no-regret property we get
E[u1(b)] ≥ α1γ1v1 − E[α1γπ(1)bπ(1)].
By summing over all players and writing the social welfare as the sum of utilities plus the total payments,
we get:
E[SW (π(b),v)] = E[
∑
i
ui(b)] + E[
∑
i
αiγπ(i+1)bπ(i+1)]
≥ 1
2
E[u1(b)] +
∑
i≥2
E[ui(b)] + E[
∑
i≥2
αiγπ(i)bπ(i)]
≥ α1γ1v1
2
− E[α1γπ(1)bπ(1)]
2
+
∑
i≥2
αiγivi
2
−
∑
i≥2
E[αiγπ(i)bπ(i)] +
∑
i≥2
E[αiγπ(i)bπ(i)]
=
1
2
OPT (v)− 1
2
E[α1γπ(1)bπ(1)].
Since E[SW (π(b),v)] ≥ E[α1γπ(1)bπ(1)], we obtain that E[SW (π(b),v)] ≥ 13OPT (v).
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5.2 Learning with uncertainty
Let us now turn to the model of learning outcomes with uncertainty. As in the full information model, we can
define a Bayesian version of the coarse correlated equilibrium. A Bayesian coarse correlated equilibrium is
a joint distribution (v, γ,b) whose (v, γ)-marginals are (F,G) and satisfies the following property:
E(v,γ,b)[ui(b, γ)|vi] ≥ E(v,γ,b)[ui(b′i,b−i, γ)|vi],∀i, vi, b′i.
Similarly to Lemma 5.1, we can show that the price of total anarchy with uncertainty can be bounded by
considering the social welfare generated at any Bayesian coarse correlated equilibrium.
Lemma 5.4 Assuming that the distribution over types has finite support, the price of total anarchy with
uncertainty is at most
sup
F,G,D(·)∈CCE
Ev,γOPT (v, γ)
Ev,γ,b∼D(v)[SW (π(b),v, γ)]
where CCE is the set of Bayesian coarse correlated equilibria.
Proof Sketch. The proof follows the same lines as the proof of Lemma 5.1. For each t ≥ 1, (vt, γt,bt) is
the tuple of profiles corresponding to round t. Since the distribution over types has finite support, there is
almost surely some T0 such that, for each type profile v˜ in the support of F, there is t ≤ T0 such that vt = v˜.
For each T ≥ T0, let DT be the joint distribution on (v, γ,b) that samples t uniformly from {1, 2, . . . , T}
and outputs (vt, γt,bt). This defines a sequence of distributions {DT }T≥T0 . Now, it is enough to observe
that each convergent subsequence converges to a Bayesian coarse correlated equilibrium. Therefore the
price of total anarchy is bounded by the price of anarchy over Bayesian coarse correlated equilibria.
Remark 5.5 Since our theorems hold in the limit as T goes to infinity, they do not depend on the speed of
learning – which we can define as the speed in which subsequences of {DT }T converge to a Bayesian coarse
correlated equilibrium in the proof above. The rate of convergence depends on the specific learning methods
being used by the players. However, the reader might notice that, regardless of the learning methods used,
the speed of learning will depend on the time required for the empirical distribution of v, γ to resemble the
real distribution. The speed in which this happens is controlled, for example, by the Central Limit Theorem.
Also, if players observe only realized payoffs each round (rather than expectations), one would expect low
click-through rates to increase the amount of time needed for learning, since more rounds will be required
to accurately estimate expected outcomes. See Auer et al. [4] for a more detailed discussion on the speed of
convergence of no-regret algorithms with limited feedback.
The arguments in the proof of Lemma 3.3 can be used with essentially no change to show that (λ, µ)-
semi-smoothness implies a bound of (µ+1)/λ to the price of total anarchy with uncertainty. From this, we
know that:
Theorem 5.6 The price of total anarchy of the Generalized Second Price auction with uncertainty is bounded
by 3.164.
In Appendix A we present an improved result for the Bayesian price of anarchy that also extends to the
following improved bound for learning outcomes.
Theorem 5.7 The price of total anarchy of the Generalized Second Price auction with uncertainty is bounded
by 2.927.
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A Improved Bounds for Games with Uncertainty
In this section, we prove Theorems 3.1 and 5.7. The idea of the proof is analogous to our proof of the bound
of 3.164 in Section 3, based on semi-smoothness, but will use a modification of semi-smoothness specially
tailored to the GSP auction game, analogous to the way we modified the simple bound of 4 derived using
the (1/2, 1)-semi-smoothness of GSP to a bound of 3 on the price of total anarchy for the full information
case in Section 5. We handle the case when a player has the highest effective value separately, and show
that there exists a bidding profile b′ such that the following inequality holds.
E[
∑
i
ui(b
′
i(vi),b−i, γ)] ≥ βE[OPT (v, γ)] − (1 + δ)
∑
i
E[αiγπ(i)bπ(i)] + E[α1γπ(1)bπ(1)]. (5)
This inequality is analogous but weaker than claiming that GSP is (β, δ)-semi-smooth, yet we will show
that it implies that the price of anarchy (and the price of total anarchy) is bounded by 1+δβ . This connection
is stated in the next lemma.
Lemma A.1 Assume that for every GSP auction game there is a bidding profile b′ and parameters β, δ > 0
such that inequality (5) holds for any strategy profile b. Then, the price of anarchy of the Generalized
Second Price auction with uncertainty is at most 1+δβ . The same bound applies to the price of total anarchy
with uncertainty as well.
Proof. Consider a Nash equilibrium bidding profile b. Clearly, E[ui(b, γ)] ≥ E[ui(b′i(vi),b−i, γ)] by
selecting the bidding profile b′ as in inequality (5). We use this inequality and the fact that the social
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welfare is the sum of the expected utilities of the advertisers plus the total payments to get
E[SW (π(b(v), γ),v, γ)] = E[
∑
i
ui(b, γ)] + E[
∑
i
αiγπ(i+1)bπ(i+1)]
≥ E[
∑
i
ui(b
′
i(vi),b−i, γ)] + E[
∑
i
αiγπ(i+1)bπ(i+1)]
≥ βE[OPT (v, γ)] − (1 + δ)
∑
i
E[αiγπ(i)bπ(i)] + E[α1γπ(1)bπ(1)]
+
∑
i≥2
E[αiγπ(i)bπ(i)]
= βE[OPT (v, γ)] − δ
∑
i
E[αiγπ(i)bπ(i)]
≥ βE[OPT (v, γ)] − δE[SW (π(b(v), γ),v, γ)],
which implies that the price of anarchy is at most 1+δβ , as desired. To get the same bound for the price of
total anarchy, consider a coarse correlated equilibrium b instead of a Nash equilibrium.
The next lemma (Lemma A.3) connects inequality (5) to the existence of functions with particular prop-
erties which we call (β, δ)-bounded functions.
Definition A.2 Let β, δ > 0 and g : [0, 1] → R+. Function g is (β, δ)-bounded if the following three
properties hold:
i)
∫ 1
0
g(y) dy ≤ 1,
ii) (1− z)
∫ 1
z
g(y) dy ≥ β − δz, ∀z ∈ [0, 1],
iii)
∫ 1
z
(1− y)g(y) dy ≥ β − (1 + δ)z, ∀z ∈ [0, 1].
Recall that the proof of Lemma 3.5 that GSP is (1 − 1e , 1)-semi-smooth relied on a random distribution
with density f(y) = 11−y for y ∈ [0, (1 − 1e )] and f(y) = 0 otherwise, and considered the bid distribution
b′i = yvi for player i with valuation vi. The improved proof in Lemma A.3 uses a (β, δ)-bounded function
g in place of this f .
Lemma A.3 Let β, δ > 0 be such that a (β, δ)-bounded function exists. Then, there is a bidding profile b′
such that inequality (5) holds for any strategy profile b.
Proof. In the proof we consider a GSP auction game with n slots with click-through-rates α1 ≥ α2 ≥ . . . ≥
αn ≥ 0 and n conservative players with random valuations v1, v2, . . . , vn ≥ 0 and random quality factors
γ1, γ2, . . . , γn ≥ 1. Let b denote any bid profile. Also, we denote by b′ the bid profile such that b′i(x) is the
most profitable deviation for player i when her valuation is vi = x. We will prove inequality (5) using this
definition for b′.
The proof is long and technical. Before presenting it, we give a high-level overview. We apply the
following three steps:
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• Step 1: We focus on advertiser iwith valuation vi = x and obtain a lower bound on her expected utility
E[ui(b
′
i,b−i, γ)|vi = x] when deviating to b′i(x). The main idea we use here is that the deviation to
bid b′i(x) is more profitable for advertiser i than deviating to the bid yx, for every y ∈ [0, 1]. This
yields infinitely many lower bounds on E[ui(b′i,b−i, γ)|vi = x]; we combine them in a single lower
bound by taking their weighted average, with weights indicated by the values of a (β, δ)-bounded
function g.
• Step 2: We further refine the lower bound on E[ui(b′i,b−i, γ)|vi = x]. Here, we reason about the slots
advertiser i would occupy by deviating to bid yx and the utility she would then have, and we use the
properties of (β, δ)-bounded functions. We consider slot 1 and slots i ≥ 2 separately, as we did in the
proof of Theorem 5.3.
• Step 3: We use the bound obtained in Step 2 in order to compute a lower bound for the total expected
utility of all players when deviating to b′. We first lower-bound the unconditional expected utility of
advertiser i and, then, we simply sum the obtained inequalities over all advertisers in order to obtain
inequality (5).
Step 1: Focus on player i and let x be a possible valuation for this player. Let β, δ > 0 and consider a
(β, δ)-bounded function g : [0, 1] → R+. Using the first property in Definition A.2 for g and the fact that
b′i(x) is the most profitable deviation for advertiser i, we have
E[ui(b
′
i(x),b−i, γ)|vi = x] ≥
∫ 1
0
g(y)E[ui(b
′
i(x),b−i, γ)|vi = x] dy
≥
∫ 1
0
g(y)E[ui(yx,b−i, γ)|vi = x] dy.
Given any slot j, let Aijx denote the event that vi = x and ν(i) = j and Bijx denote the event that ν(i) = j
given that vi = x. Using these definitions, we can rewrite the quantity E[ui(yx,b−i, γ)|vi = x] for every
y ∈ [0, 1] as
E[ui(yx,b−i, γ)|vi = x] =
n∑
j=1
E[ui(yx,b−i, γ)|Aijx ] · P[Bijx ].
By the last two (in)equalities, we obtain that
E[ui(b
′
i(x),b−i, γ)|vi = x] ≥
∫ 1
0
g(y)
n∑
j=1
E[ui(yx,b−i, γ)|Aijx ] · P[Bijx ] dy
=
n∑
j=1
∫ 1
0
g(y)E[ui(yx,b−i, γ)|Aijx ] dy · P[Bijx ]. (6)
Step 2: Our purpose now is to refine the lower bound provided by inequality (6). Let πi(b−i, i) be the
player with the i-th highest effective bid in b−i.
First consider slot 1 separately. Assume that the event Ai1x is true, i.e., vi = x and ν(i) = 1. We
will first lower-bound the quantity E[ui(yx,b−i, γ)|Ai1x ] for every y ∈ [0, 1]. By deviating to bid yx,
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player i is allocated the first slot whenever γiyx > γπi(1)bπi(1); in this case, player i has utility at least
α1(γix− γπi(1)bπi(1)). Hence,
E[ui(yx,b−i, γ)|Ai1x ] ≥ E[α1(γix− γπi(1)bπi(1))1{γiyx > γπi(1)bπi(1)}|Ai1x ].
We set z =
γ
pii(1)bpii(1)
γix
and use this last inequality to obtain
∫ 1
0
g(y)E[ui(yx,b−i, γ)|Ai1x ] dy ≥
∫ 1
0
g(y) · E[α1γix(1− z)1{y > z}|Ai1x ] dy
= E[α1γix(1− z)
∫ 1
0
g(y)1{y > z}dy|Ai1x ]
= E[α1γix(1− z)
∫ 1
z
g(y) dy|Ai1x ]
≥ E[α1
(
βγix− δγπi(1)bπi(1)
) |Ai1x ] (7)
where the second inequality follows by the second property of Definition A.2 for function g (and using the
definition of z).
Now, assume that the event Aijx is true for j ≥ 2, i.e., vi = x and ν(i) = j. We will lower-bound the
quantity E[ui(yx,b−i, γ)|Aijx ] for every y ∈ [0, 1]. By deviating to bid yx, player i is allocated slot j (or a
higher one) whenever γiyx > γπi(j)bπi(j); in this case, player i has utility at least αjγix(1− y). Hence,
E[ui(yx,b−i, γ)|Aijx ] ≥ E[αjγix(1− y)1{γiyx > γπi(j)bπi(j)}|Aijx ].
We set z =
γ
pii(j)bpii(j)
γix
and use this last inequality to obtain
∫ 1
0
g(y)E[ui(yx,b−i, γ)|Aijx ] dy ≥
∫ 1
0
g(y)E[αjγix(1− y)1{y > z}|Aijx ] dy
= E[αjγix
∫ 1
z
(1− y)g(y) dy|Aijx ]
≥ E[αj
(
βγix− (1 + δ)γπi(j)bπi(j)
) |Aijx ]. (8)
The second inequality follows by the third property of Definition A.2 for function g (and using the definition
of z).
We now use inequality (6) together with the lower bounds for ∫ 10 g(y)E[ui(yx,b−i, γ)|Aijx ] dy obtained
in (7) and (8). We have
E[ui(b
′
i(x),b−i, γ)|vi = x] ≥ E[α1
(
βγix− δγπi(1)bπi(1)
) |Ai1x ] · P[Bi1x ]
+
n∑
j=2
E[αj
(
βγix− (1 + δ)γπi(j)bπi(j)
) |Aijx ] · P[Bijx ]
= β
n∑
j=1
E[αjγix|Aijx ] · P[Bijx ]− δE[α1γπi(1)bπi(1)|Ai1x ] · P[Bi1x ]
− (1 + δ)
n∑
j=2
E[αjγπi(j)bπi(j)|Aijx ] · P[Bijx ].
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Step 3: We can now bound the unconditional expected utility of player i when deviating to strategy b′i(vi)
by integrating over the range of valuations for player i and using the last inequality obtained in Step 2. In
the following we use fvi(x) to denote the probability density function of the random variable vi. We have
E[ui(b
′
i(vi),b−i, γ)] =
∫ ∞
0
E[ui(b
′
i(vi),b−i, γ)] · fvi(x) dx
≥ β
n∑
j=1
∫ ∞
0
E[αjγivi|Aijx ] · P[Bijx ] · fvi(x) dx
− δ
∫ ∞
0
E[α1γπi(1)bπi(1)|Ai1x ] · P[Bi1x ] · fvi(x) dx
− (1 + δ)
n∑
j=2
∫ ∞
0
E[αjγπi(j)bπi(j)|Aijx ] · P[Bijx ] · fvi(x) dx.
Now, we use the property∫ ∞
0
E[Z|Aijx ] · P[Bijx ] · fvi(x) dx = E[Z|ν(i) = j] · P[ν(i) = j],
for any random variable Z as well as the fact that γπi(j)bπi(j) ≤ γπ(j)bπ(j) to obtain that
E[ui(b
′
i(vi),b−i, γ)]
≥ β
n∑
j=1
E[αjγivi|ν(i) = j] · P[ν(i) = j]− δE[α1γπi(1)bπi(1)|ν(i) = 1] · P[ν(i) = 1]
− (1 + δ)
n∑
j=2
E[αjγπi(j)bπi(j)|ν(i) = j] · P[ν(i) = j]
≥ β
n∑
j=1
E[αjγivi|ν(i) = j] · P[ν(i) = j]− δE[α1γπ(1)bπ(1)|ν(i) = 1] · P[ν(i) = 1]
− (1 + δ)
n∑
j=2
E[αjγπ(j)bπ(j)|ν(i) = j] · P[ν(i) = j]
= β
n∑
j=1
E[αjγivi|ν(i) = j] · P[ν(i) = j]− (1 + δ)
n∑
j=1
E[αjγπ(j)bπ(j)|ν(i) = j] · P[ν(i) = j]
+ E[α1γπ(1)bπ(1)|ν(i) = 1] · P[ν(i) = 1]
= βE[αν(i)γivi]− (1 + δ)E[αν(i)γπ(ν(i))bπ(ν(i))] + E[α1γπ(1)bπ(1)|ν(i) = 1] · P[ν(i) = 1].
By summing over all players, we obtain inequality (5). In particular,∑
i
E[ui(b
′
i(vi),b−i, γ)] ≥ β
∑
i
E[αν(i)γivi]− (1 + δ)
∑
i
E[αν(i)γπ(ν(i))bπ(ν(i))]
+
∑
i
E[α1γπ(1)bπ(1)|ν(i) = 1] · P[ν(i) = 1]
= βE[OPT (v, γ)] − (1 + δ)
∑
i
E[αiγπ(i)bπ(i)] + E[α1γπ(1)bπ(1)].
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Therefore, by Lemmas A.1 and A.3, in order to bound the price of anarchy, it suffices to find a (β, δ)-
bounded function such that the ratio 1+δβ is as low as possible. This is the purpose of the following lemma.
Lemma A.4 Consider a function g : [0, 1] → R+ defined as follows:
g(y) =


κ
1−y , y ∈ [0, λ),
(κ−1)(1−µ)
(1−y)2 , y ∈ [λ, µ),
0, y ∈ [µ, 1],
where κ > 1 and 1 > µ ≥ λ ≥ 0 such that (κ−1)(µ−λ)1−λ − κ ln(1 − λ) ≤ 1, and (κ − 1)(1 − µ) ln 1−λ1−µ −
(κ− 1)µ + κλ ≥ 0. Then, g(y) is an ((κ− 1)µ, κ− 1)-bounded function.
Proof. We begin by computing
∫ 1
0 g(y) dy. It holds that∫ 1
0
g(y) dy =
∫ λ
0
κ
1− y dy +
∫ µ
λ
(κ− 1)(1− µ)
(1− y)2 dy =
(κ− 1)(µ − λ)
1− λ − κ ln(1− λ) ≤ 1,
where the inequality holds by the first assumption concerning κ, λ and µ. Hence, g satisfies the first property
of Definition A.2.
For the second property of Definition A.2 it suffices to prove that
(1− z)
∫ 1
z
g(y) dy + (κ− 1)(z − µ) ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ [0, 1].
We distinguish between three cases depending on z. First, we consider the case that z ∈ [µ, 1]. We have
(1− z)
∫ 1
z
g(y) dy + (κ− 1)(z − µ) = (κ− 1)(z − µ) ≥ 0,
where the inequality holds since z ∈ [µ, 1] and κ > 1. For z ∈ (λ, µ) we have
(1− z)
∫ 1
z
g(y) dy + (κ− 1)(z − µ) = (1− z)
∫ µ
z
(κ− 1)(1 − µ)
(1− y)2 dy + (κ− 1)(z − µ) = 0.
Finally, for z ∈ [0, λ] we have
(1− z)
∫ 1
z
g(y) dy + (κ− 1)(z − µ)
= (1− z)
∫ λ
z
κ
1− y dy + (1− z)
∫ µ
λ
(κ− 1)(1 − µ)
(1− y)2 dy + (κ− 1)(z − µ)
= (1− z)κ ln 1− z
1− λ +
(1− z)(κ − 1)(µ − λ)
1− λ + (κ− 1)(z − µ)
≥ (κ− 1)(µ − λ) + (κ− 1)(λ− µ)
= 0,
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where the inequality follows by the fact that the derivative with respect to z is negative for z ∈ [0, λ]. Hence,
it holds that g satisfies the second property of Definition A.2.
It remains to prove that g satisfies the third property of Definition A.2. Similarly, it suffices to prove that∫ 1
z
(1− y)g(y) dy − (κ− 1)µ + κz ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ [0, 1].
Again, we distinguish between three cases depending on z. First, we consider the case that z ∈ [µ, 1]. We
have ∫ 1
z
(1− y)g(y) dy − (κ− 1)µ + κz = − (κ− 1)µ + κz ≥ µ ≥ 0,
where the first inequality follows since z ∈ [µ, 1]. For z ∈ [λ, µ) we have
∫ 1
z
(1− y)g(y) dy − (κ− 1)µ + κz =
∫ µ
z
(κ− 1)(1 − µ)
(1− y)2 dy − (κ− 1)µ + κz
= (κ− 1)(1 − µ) ln 1− z
1− µ − (κ− 1)µ+ κz
≥ (κ− 1)(1 − µ) ln 1− λ
1− µ − (κ− 1)µ+ κλ
≥ 0,
where the first inequality follows by the fact that the derivative with respect to z is strictly positive for
z ∈ [λ, µ), and the second inequality follows by the second assumption concerning κ, λ and µ. Finally, for
z ∈ [0, λ) we have
∫ 1
z
(1− y)g(y) dy − (κ− 1)µ + κz =
∫ λ
z
κdy +
∫ µ
λ
(κ− 1)(1 − µ)
(1− y)2 dy − (κ− 1)µ + κz
= (κ− 1)(1 − µ) ln 1− λ
1− µ − (κ− 1)µ + κλ
≥ 0,
where the inequality follows by the second assumption concerning κ, λ and µ. The proof of the lemma is
complete.
We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorems 3.1 and 5.7. The two conditions of Lemma A.4
are satisfied for κ = 1.7507, λ = 0.225, and µ = 0.7966. By combining Lemmas A.1, A.3, and A.4,
we conclude that the price of (total) anarchy of GSP auction games over Bayes-Nash equilibria is at most
κ
(κ−1)µ < 2.9276.
B Improved Bounds for Pure Nash Equilibria
In this section we present our results for pure Nash equilibria in the full information setting (Theorems 4.1
and 4.2). For simplicity of exposition, we consider all quality factors to be equal to 1; so, γ does not appear
in notation. Our proofs can be adapted to different quality factors in a straightforward way. We consider GSP
auction games with n advertisers with valuations v1 ≥ . . . ≥ vn ≥ 0 and n slots with click-through-rates
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α1 ≥ . . . ≥ αn ≥ 0. We assume that neither all slots have the same click-through-rate nor all advertisers
have the same valuation (in both cases, the price of anarchy is 1).
We use the term inefficiency of allocation π to refer to the ratio OPT (v)/SW (π,v). In Lemma 4.5 we
showed that every pure Nash equilibrium corresponds to a weakly feasible allocation. Hence, the price of
anarchy of a GSP auction game over pure Nash equilibria is upper-bounded by the worst-case inefficiency
among weakly feasible allocations.
Definition B.1 An allocation π is called proper if for any two slots i < j with equal click-through-rates, it
holds π(i) < π(j).
Clearly, for any non-proper weakly feasible allocation, we can construct a proper weakly feasible one with
equal social welfare. Hence, in order to prove our upper bounds, we essentially upper-bound the worst-case
inefficiency over proper weakly feasible allocations.
Given an allocation π, consider the directed graph G(π) that has one node for each slot, and a directed
edge for each advertiser i that connects the node corresponding to slot i to the node corresponding to slot
π−1(i). In general, G(π) consists of a set of disjoint cycles and may contain self-loops.
Definition B.2 An allocation π is called reducible if its directed graph G(π) has more than one cycles.
Otherwise, it is called irreducible.
Given a reducible allocation π such that G(π) has c ≥ 2 cycles, we can construct c GSP auction subgames
by considering the slots and the advertisers that correspond to the nodes and edges of each cycle. Similarly,
for ℓ = 1, . . . , c, the restriction πℓ of π to the slots and advertisers of the ℓ-th subgame is an allocation for
this game. The next fact essentially states that we can focus on irreducible allocations.
Fact B.3 If allocation π is weakly feasible for the original GSP auction game, then πℓ is weakly feasible for
the ℓ-th subgame as well, for ℓ = 1, . . . , c. Then, the inefficiency of π is at most the maximum inefficiency
among the allocations πℓ for ℓ = 1, . . . , c.
When considering irreducible weakly feasible allocations, we further assume that the index of the slot
advertiser 1 occupies is smaller than the index of the advertiser that is assigned to slot 1. This is without
loss of generality due to the following argument. Consider an irreducible weakly feasible allocation π for
a GSP auction game with n advertisers such that π−1(1) > π(1). We construct a new game with click-
through-rate a′i = vi for slot i and valuation v′i = αi for advertiser i, for i = 1, . . . , n, and the allocation
π∗ = π−1. Observe that π−1∗ (1) = π(1) < π−1(1) = π∗(1). Clearly, the optimal social welfare is the
same in both games while the social welfare of π∗ for the new game is SW (π∗,v′) =
∑
i a
′
iv
′
π∗(i)
=∑
i viαπ∗(i) =
∑
i απ−1(i)vi = SW (π,v). We can also prove the weak feasibility conditions for π∗ in the
new game for each i, j. In order to do so, consider the weak feasibility condition for π in the original game
for advertisers π(j), π(i). It is αjvπ(j) ≥ αi(vπ(j) − vπ(i)) and, equivalently, vπ(i)αi ≥ vπ(j)(αi − αj).
By the definition of the click-through-rates and the valuations in the new game and the definition of π∗, we
obtain that a′
π−1∗ (i)
v′i ≥ a′π−1∗ (j)(v
′
i − v′j) as desired.
We furthermore note that when vn = 0, any proper weakly feasible allocation is reducible. This is
obviously the case if all advertisers with zero valuation use the last slots. Otherwise, consider an advertiser i
with non-zero valuation that is assigned a slot π−1(i) > π−1(j) where j is an advertiser with zero valuation.
Since the allocation is proper, it holds that απ−1(i) < απ−1(j). Then, we obtain a contradiction by the weak
feasibility condition απ−1(i)vi ≥ απ−1(j)(vi − vj) for advertisers i, j.
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B.1 GSP auction games with two and three advertisers
We now complete the proof of Theorem 4.2.
We begin by presenting the matching upper bound on the price of anarchy for two advertisers and two
slots. The upper bound follows by bounding the inefficiency of weakly feasible allocations. Consider a GSP
auction game with two slots with click-through-rates α1 ≥ α2 = βα1, for β ∈ [0, 1] and two advertisers
with valuations v1 ≥ v2 = λv1, for λ ∈ [0, 1]. The only non-optimal weakly feasible allocation π assigns
advertiser 1 to slot 2 and advertiser 2 to slot 1. Its social welfare is SW (π,v) = α1v2+α2v1 = α1v1(β+λ),
while the optimal social welfare is OPT (v) = α1v1 + α2v2 = α1v1(1 + βλ). Furthermore, the weak
feasibility condition for advertiser 1 implies that α2v1 ≥ α1(v1 − v2), i.e., β ≥ 1− λ. We have that
OPT (v)
SW (π,v)
=
1 + βλ
β + λ
≤ 1 + (β + λ)
2/4
β + λ
≤ 5/4
where the first inequality holds since the product βλ is maximized when β = λ = (β+λ)/2 and the second
inequality holds since β + λ ∈ [1, 2] and the function 1+x2/4x is non-increasing in x ∈ [1, 2].
For the case of three advertisers, we again present a tight bound on the price of anarchy. We first present
the upper bound. Consider a GSP auction game with three slots with click-through-rates α1 ≥ α2 ≥ α3 ≥ 0
and three advertisers with valuations v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥ 0 and a proper weakly feasible allocation π of slots
to advertisers. We will prove the theorem by upper-bounding the inefficiency of π by 1.259134. If π is
reducible, then the inefficiency is bounded by the inefficiency of games with two advertisers (see Fact B.3)
and the theorem follows by the upper bound of 5/4 proved for this case. So, in the following, we assume
that π is irreducible; by the observation above, this implies that v3 > 0. There are only two such allocations
which are in fact symmetric: in the first, slots 1, 2, 3 are allocated to advertisers 3, 1, 2, respectively, and in
the second, slots 1, 2, 3 are allocated to advertisers 2, 3, 1, respectively. Without loss of generality (see the
discussion above), we assume that π is the former allocation.
Let β, δ, λ, and µ be such that α2 = βα1, α3 = δα1, v2 = λv1, and v3 = µv1. Clearly, it holds that 1 ≥
β ≥ δ ≥ 0 and 1 ≥ λ ≥ µ > 0. The social welfare of allocation π is SW (π,v) = α1v1(µ+β+δλ) whereas
the optimal social welfare is OPT (v) = α1v1(1 + βλ+ δµ). Furthermore, since π is weakly feasible, the
weak feasibility conditions for advertisers 1 and 3 and advertisers 2 and 3 are α2v1 ≥ α1(v1 − v3) and
α3v2 ≥ α1(v2 − v3), respectively, i.e., β ≥ 1 − µ and δ ≥ 1 − µλ . We are now ready to bound the
inefficiency of π. Let ǫ, θ ≥ 0 be such that β = 1− µ+ ǫ and δ = 1− µλ + θ. We have
OPT (v)
SW (π,v)
=
1 + βλ+ δµ
µ+ β + δλ
=
1 + λ− µλ+ µ− µ2λ + ǫλ+ θµ
1 + λ− µ+ ǫ+ θλ
≤ 1 + λ− µλ+ µ−
µ2
λ
1 + λ− µ .
The inequality follows since 1 ≥ λ ≥ µ > 0 implies that 1 + λ− µλ+ µ− µ2λ = 1+ λ− µ+ µ(1− λ) +
µ(1− µ/λ) ≥ 1 + λ− µ ≥ 1 and ǫ+ θλ ≥ ǫλ+ θµ ≥ 0.
For µ ∈ [0, 1], this last expression is maximized for the value of µ that makes its derivative with respect
to µ equal to zero, i.e., µ = −√λ3 + 1 + λ+ 1. By substituting µ, we obtain that
OPT (v)
SW (π,v)
≤ λ
2 + λ+ 2− 2√λ3 + 1
λ
≤ 1 + 2ζ = 1.259134
where ζ = 0.129567 and the second inequality follows by the following lemma (Lemma B.4).
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Lemma B.4 Let ζ = 0.129567. For any λ ∈ [0, 1], it holds that √λ3 + 1 ≥ 1− ζλ+ λ22 .
Proof. Since both parts of the inequality are non-negative for λ ∈ [0, 1], it suffices to show that the function
f(λ) = (λ3 + 1) −
(
1− ζλ+ λ22
)2
is non-negative for λ ∈ [0, 1]. Let g(λ) = −λ34 + (1 + ζ)λ2 − (1 +
ζ2)λ+2ζ and observe that f(λ) = λ ·g(λ). The proof will follow by proving that g(λ) ≥ 0 when λ ∈ [0, 1].
Observe that the derivative of g is strictly negative for λ = 0 and strictly positive for λ = 1. Hence, the
minimum of g in [0, 1] is achieved at the point λ∗ = 4+4ζ−2
√
ζ2+8ζ+1
3 where the derivative of g becomes
zero. Straightforward calculations yield that g(λ∗) > 0 and the lemma follows.
In the following we prove that the above analysis is tight. Consider a GSP auction game with three
advertisers with valuations v1 = 1, v2 = 0.5296, and v3 = 0.14583, respectively, and three slots with
click-through-rates α1 = 1, α2 = 0.55071, and α3 = 0.4704, respectively. Let b = (b1, b2, b3) be a bid
vector with b1 = 0, b2 = v2 = 0.5296, and b3 = v3 = 0.14583, respectively. So, advertiser 2 is allocated
slot 1, advertiser 3 is allocated slot 2, and advertiser 1 is allocated slot 3. We refer to this allocation as π. It
is not hard to verify that b is a pure Nash equilibrium, and that the price of anarchy is given by:
OPT (v)
SW (π,v)
=
α1v1 + α2v2 + α3v3
α1v2 + α2v3 + α3v1
≥ 1.259133.
The proof of Theorem 4.2 is complete.
B.2 GSP auction games with many advertisers
We now prove Theorem 4.1. In order to do so, we will actually prove the stronger claim that the worst-
case inefficiency among weakly feasible allocations of any GSP auction game is at most r = 61+7
√
217
128 ≈
1.28216. We use induction. As the base of our induction, we use the fact that GSP auction games with one,
two, or three advertisers have worst-case inefficiency among weakly feasible allocations at most 1.28216.
For a single advertiser, the claim is trivial. For two or three advertisers, it follows by the proof of Theorem
4.2. Let n ≥ 4 be an integer. Using the inductive hypothesis that the worst-case inefficiency among weakly
feasible allocations of any GSP auction game with at most n− 1 advertisers is at most r, we will show that
this is also the case for any GSP auction game with n advertisers.
Consider a GSP auction game with n advertisers with valuations v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥ vn ≥ 0 and n slots
with click-through-rates α1 ≥ α2 ≥ . . . ≥ αn ≥ 0 and let π be a proper weakly feasible allocation. If π is
reducible, the claim follows by Fact B.3 and the inductive hypothesis. So, in the following, we assume that
π is irreducible; this implies that vn > 0. Let j be the advertiser that is assigned slot 1 and i1 be the slot
assigned to advertiser 1. Without loss of generality, we assume that i1 < j since the other case is symmetric;
see the discussion at the beginning of Section B. Also, let i2 be the slot assigned to advertiser i1. By our
assumptions, the integers j, 1, i1, and i2 are different.
We will show that
SW (π,v) ≥ α1vj + αi1(v1 −
vi1
r
) + αi2(vi1 − vj)−
α1v1
r
+
OPT (v)
r
. (9)
Once we have proved inequality (9), we can obtain the desired relation between SW (π,v) and OPT (v)
using the following technical lemma.
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Lemma B.5 Let r = 61+7
√
217
128 ≈ 1.28216 and f(β, δ, λ, µ) = µ + β
(
1− λr
)
+ δ(λ − µ) − 1r . Then, the
objective value of the mathematical program
minimize f(β, δ, λ, µ)
subject to β ≥ 1− µ
δ ≥ 1− µ/λ
1 ≥ λ ≥ µ > 0
1 ≥ β, δ ≥ 0
is non-negative.
Proof. Since µ ≤ λ ≤ 1, we have that f(β, δ, λ, µ) is non-decreasing in β and δ. Using the first two
constraints, we have that the objective value of the mathematical program is at least
f
(
1− µ, 1− µ
λ
, λ, µ
)
= 1− 1
r
+ λ− λ
r
− µ
(
2− λ
r
)
+
µ2
λ
,
which is minimized for µ = λ− λ22r to
f
(
1− λ+ λ
2
2r
,
λ
2r
, λ, λ− λ
2
2r
)
= 1− 1
r
− λ
r
+
λ2
r
− λ
3
4r2
.
In order to complete the proof it suffices to show that the function g(λ) = 1− 1r − λr + λ
2
r − λ
3
4r2
is non-
negative for λ ∈ [0, 1]. Observe that g(λ) is a polynomial of degree 3 and, hence, it has at most one local
minimum. Also observe that the derivative of g(λ) is−1r + 2λr − 3λ
2
4r2 which is strictly negative for λ = 0 and
strictly positive for λ = 1. Hence, its minimum in [0, 1] is achieved at the point λ∗ = 4r−2
√
4r2−3r
3 where
the derivative becomes zero. Straightforward calculations yield that g(λ∗) = 0 and the lemma follows.
So, assuming that (9) holds, we can apply Lemma B.5 with β = αi1/α1, δ = αi2/α1, λ = vi1/v1, and
µ = vj/v1. Clearly, the last two constraints of the mathematical program in Lemma B.5 are satisfied. Also,
observe that the weak feasibility conditions for advertisers 1 and j and advertisers i1 and j in allocation π
are αi1v1 ≥ α1(v1 − vj) and αi2vi1 ≥ α1(vi1 − vj), respectively, i.e., β ≥ 1− µ and δ ≥ 1− µ/λ and the
first two constraints of the mathematical program in Lemma B.5 are satisfied as well. Now, using inequality
(9) and Lemma B.5, we have that
SW (π,v) ≥ f
(
αi1
α1
,
αi2
α1
,
vi1
v1
,
vj
v1
)
· α1v1 + OPT (v)
r
≥ OPT (v)
r
and the proof follows.
It remains to prove inequality (9). We distinguish between three cases depending on the relative order
of j, i1, and i2; in each of these cases, we further distinguish between two subcases. In each case, we
exploit the structure of allocation π to reason as follows. We consider a restriction of the original game
(i.e., a different “restricted” game) by removing some advertisers from the original game and the slots they
occupy in π. The particular advertisers to be removed are different in each case. We denote by π′ the
restriction of allocation π to the advertisers and slots of the restricted game. We also use v′ to denote the
valuation profile in the restricted game; so, SW (π′,v′) denotes the social welfare of π′ in the restricted
game. An important observation is that π′ is a weakly feasible allocation in the restricted game since the
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weak feasibility conditions for π′ are just a subset of the corresponding conditions for π (for the original
game). Furthermore, the restricted game has at most n− 1 advertisers and, by the inductive hypothesis, we
know that the inefficiency of π′ is at most r. Then, inequality (9) follows using this fact and by carefully
expressing the optimal social welfare in the new game.
Case I.1: 1 < i1 < j < i2 and αj ≤ αi2r. Consider the restriction of the original game that consists of
the advertisers different than j, 1, and i1 and the slots different than 1, i1, and i2. Let π′ be the restriction of
π to the advertisers and slots of the new game and let v′ be the restriction of v to all advertisers besides j, 1
and i1. Clearly, π′ is weakly feasible for the new game since the weak feasibility conditions for π′ are just a
subset of the corresponding conditions for π (for the original game). Also, note that the efficient allocation
for the restricted game assigns advertiser k to slot k for k = 2, . . . , i1−1, i1+1, . . . , j−1, i2+1, . . . , n and
advertiser k + 1 to slot k for k = j, . . . , i2 − 1. By the inductive hypothesis, we know that the inefficiency
of π′ is at most r. Hence, we can bound the social welfare of π as
SW (π,v) = α1vj + αi1v1 + αi2vi1 +
∑
k 6∈{1,i1,i2}
αkvπ(k)
= α1vj + αi1v1 + αi2vi1 + SW (π
′,v′)
≥ α1vj + αi1v1 + αi2vi1 +
1
r

i1−1∑
k=2
αkvk +
j−1∑
k=i1+1
αkvk +
i2−1∑
k=j
αkvk+1 +
n∑
k=i2+1
αkvk


≥ α1vj + αi1v1 + αi2vi1 +
1
r

i1−1∑
k=2
αkvk +
j−1∑
k=i1+1
αkvk +
i2∑
k=j+1
αkvk +
n∑
k=i2+1
αkvk


= α1vj + αi1v1 + αi2vi1 +
1
r
(
n∑
k=1
αkvk − α1v1 − αi1vi1 − αjvj
)
≥ α1vj + αi1(v1 −
vi1
r
) + αi2(vi1 − vj)−
α1v1
r
+
OPT (v)
r
and inequality (9) follows. The first inequality follows by the inductive hypothesis and the definition of
the efficient allocation for the restricted game. The second inequality follows since αk ≥ αk+1 for k =
j, . . . , i2 − 1. The last inequality follows since αj ≤ αi2r.
Case I.2: 1 < i1 < j < i2 and αj > αi2r. We use the restriction of the original game that consists of the
advertisers different than j and 1 and the slots different than 1 and i1. Now, the efficient allocation for the
restricted game assigns advertiser k to slot k for k = 2, . . . , i1 − 1, j + 1, . . . , n and advertiser k− 1 to slot
k for k = i1 + 1, . . . , j. Using the inductive hypothesis for the restriction π′ of π to the restricted game, we
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can bound the social welfare of π as
SW (π,v) = α1vj + αi1v1 +
∑
k 6∈{1,i1}
αkvπ(k)
= α1vj + αi1v1 + SW (π
′,v′)
≥ α1vj + αi1v1 +
1
r

i1−1∑
k=2
αkvk +
j∑
k=i1+1
αkvk−1 +
n∑
k=j+1
αkvk


= α1vj + αi1v1 +
1
r

 n∑
k=1
αkvk − α1v1 − αi1vi1 +
j∑
k=i1+1
αk(vk−1 − vk)


≥ α1vj + αi1v1 +
1
r

 n∑
k=1
αkvk − α1v1 − αi1vi1 + αj
j∑
k=i1+1
(vk−1 − vk)


= α1vj + αi1v1 −
1
r
(α1v1 + αi1vi1 + αjvj − αjvi1) +
OPT (v)
r
> α1vj + αi1(v1 −
vi1
r
) + αi2(vi1 − vj)−
α1v1
r
+
OPT (v)
r
and inequality (9) follows. The first inequality follows by the inductive hypothesis and the definition of the
efficient allocation for the restricted game. The second inequality follows since αk ≥ αj and vk−1− vk ≥ 0
for k = i1 + 1, . . . , j. The last inequality follows since αj > αi2r.
Case II.1: 1 < i1 < i2 < j and vi2 ≤ vjr. We use the restriction of the original game that consists of the
advertisers different than j, 1, and i1 and the slots different than 1, i1, and i2. Now, the efficient allocation
for the restricted game assigns advertiser k to slot k for k = 2, . . . , i1 − 1, i1 + 1, . . . , i2 − 1, j + 1, . . . , n
and advertiser k − 1 to slot k for k = i2 + 1, . . . , j. Using the inductive hypothesis for the restriction π′ of
π to the restricted game, we can bound the social welfare of π as
SW (π,v) = α1vj + αi1v1 + αi2vi1 +
∑
k 6∈{1,i1,i2}
αkvπ(k)
= α1vj + αi1v1 + αi2vi1 + SW (π
′,v′)
≥ α1vj + αi1v1 + αi2vi1 +
1
r

i1−1∑
k=2
αkvk +
i2−1∑
k=i1+1
αkvk +
j∑
k=i2+1
αkvk−1 +
n∑
k=j+1
αkvk


≥ α1vj + αi1v1 + αi2vi1 +
1
r

i1−1∑
k=2
αkvk +
i2−1∑
k=i1+1
αkvk +
j∑
k=i2+1
αkvk +
n∑
k=j+1
αkvk


= α1vj + αi1v1 + αi2vi1 +
1
r
(
n∑
k=1
αkvk − α1v1 − αi1vi1 − αi2vi2
)
≥ α1vj + αi1(v1 −
vi1
r
) + αi2(vi1 − vj)−
α1v1
r
+
OPT (v)
r
and inequality (9) follows. The first inequality follows by the inductive hypothesis and the definition of
the efficient allocation for the restricted game. The second inequality follows since vk−1 ≥ vk for k =
i2 + 1, . . . , j. The last inequality follows since vi2 ≤ vjr.
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Case II.2: 1 < i1 < i2 < j and vi2 > vjr. We use the restriction of the original game that consists of
the advertisers different than 1 and i1 and the slots different than i1 and i2. Now, the efficient allocation for
the restricted game assigns advertiser k to slot k for k = i2 + 1, . . . , n, advertiser i1 + 1 to slot i1 − 1, and
advertiser k + 1 to slot k for k = 1, . . . , i1 − 2, i1 + 1, . . . , i2 − 1. Using the inductive hypothesis for the
restriction π′ of π to the advertisers and slots of the restricted game, we can bound the social welfare of π as
SW (π,v) = αi1v1 + αi2vi1 +
∑
k 6∈{i1,i2}
αkvπ(k)
= αi1v1 + αi2vi1 + SW (π
′,v′)
≥ αi1v1 + αi2vi1 +
1
r

i1−2∑
k=1
αkvk+1 + αi1−1vi1+1 +
i2−1∑
k=i1+1
αkvk+1 +
n∑
k=i2+1
αkvk


= αi1v1 + αi2vi1 +
1
r
(
n∑
k=1
αkvk +
i1−2∑
k=1
(αk − αk+1)vk+1 + (αi1−1 − αi1+1)vi1+1
+
i2−1∑
k=i1+1
(αk − αk+1)vk+1 − α1v1 − αi1vi1


≥ αi1v1 + αi2vi1 +
1
r
(
n∑
k=1
αkvk +
i1−2∑
k=1
(αk − αk+1)vi2 + (αi1−1 − αi1+1)vi2
+
i2−1∑
k=i1+1
(αk − αk+1)vi2 − α1v1 − αi1vi1


= αi1v1 + αi2vi1 −
1
r
(α1v1 + αi1vi1 + αi2vi2 − α1vi2) +
OPT (v)
r
> α1vj + αi1(v1 −
vi1
r
) + αi2(vi1 − vj)−
α1v1
r
+
OPT (v)
r
and inequality (9) follows. The first inequality follows by the inductive hypothesis and the definition of
the efficient allocation for the restricted game. The second inequality follows since αk − αk+1 ≥ 0 and
vk+1 ≥ vi2 for k = 1, . . . , i1 − 2, i1 + 1, . . . , i2 − 1 and αi1−1 − αi1+1 ≥ 0 and vi1+1 ≥ vi2 . The last
inequality follows since vi2 > vjr and α1 > αi2 .
Case III.1: 1 < i2 < i1 < j and vi2 ≤ vjr. We use the restriction of the original game that consists of the
advertisers different than j, i1, and 1 and the slots different than 1, i2, and i1. Now, the efficient allocation
for the restricted game assigns advertiser k to slot k for k = 2, . . . , i2 − 1, j + 1, . . . , n advertiser i1 − 1
to slot i1 + 1, and advertiser k − 1 to slot k for k = i2 + 1, . . . , i1 − 1, i1 + 2, . . . , j. Using the inductive
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hypothesis for the restriction π′ of π to the restricted game, we can bound the social welfare of π as
SW (π,v) = α1vj + αi2vi1 + αi1v1 +
∑
k 6∈{1,i2,i1}
αkvπ(k)
= α1vj + αi2vi1 + αi1v1 + SW (π
′,v′)
≥ α1vj + αi2vi1 + αi1v1 +
1
r

i2−1∑
k=2
αkvk +
i1−1∑
k=i2+1
αkvk−1 + αi1+1vi1−1
+
j∑
k=i1+2
αkvk−1 +
n∑
k=j+1
αkvk


≥ α1vj + αi2vi1 + αi1v1 +
1
r

i2−1∑
k=2
αkvk +
i1−1∑
k=i2+1
αkvk +
n∑
k=i1+1
αkvk


= α1vj + αi2vi1 + αi1v1 +
1
r
(
n∑
k=1
αkvk − α1v1 − αi2vi2 − αi1vi1
)
≥ α1vj + αi1(v1 −
vi1
r
) + αi2(vi1 − vj)−
α1v1
r
+
OPT (v)
r
and inequality (9) follows. The first inequality follows by the inductive hypothesis and the definition of
the efficient allocation for the restricted game. The second inequality follows since vk−1 ≥ vk for k =
i2 + 1, . . . , i1 − 1, i1 + 2, . . . , j and vi1−1 ≥ vi1+1. The last inequality follows since vi2 ≤ vjr.
Case III.2: 1 < i2 < i1 < j and vi2 > vjr. We use the restriction of the original game that consists of the
advertisers different than i1 and 1 and the slots different than i2 and i1. Now, the efficient allocation for the
restricted game assigns advertiser k to slot k for k = i2 + 1, . . . , i1 − 1, i1 + 1, . . . , n and advertiser k + 1
to slot k for k = 1, . . . , i2 − 1. Using the inductive hypothesis for the restriction π′ of π to the restricted
game, we can bound the social welfare of π as
SW (π,v) = αi2vi1 + αi1v1 +
∑
k 6∈{i2,i1}
αkvπ(k)
= αi2vi1 + αi1v1 + SW (π
′,v′)
≥ αi2vi1 + αi1v1 +
1
r

i2−1∑
k=1
αkvk+1 +
i1−1∑
k=i2+1
αkvk +
n∑
k=i1+1
αkvk


= αi2vi1 + αi1v1 +
1
r
(
n∑
k=1
αkvk − α1v1 − αi1vi1 +
i2−1∑
k=1
(αk − αk+1)vk+1
)
≥ αi2vi1 + αi1v1 +
1
r
(
n∑
k=1
αkvk − α1v1 − αi1vi1 +
i2−1∑
k=1
(αk − αk+1)vi2
)
= αi2vi1 + αi1v1 −
1
r
(α1v1 + αi1vi1 + αi2vi2 − α1vi2) +
OPT (v)
r
> α1vj + αi1(v1 −
vi1
r
) + αi2(vi1 − vj)−
α1v1
r
+
OPT (v)
r
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and inequality (9) follows. The first inequality follows by the inductive hypothesis and the definition of
the efficient allocation for the restricted game. The second inequality follows since αk − αk+1 ≥ 0 and
vk+1 ≥ vi2 for k = 1, . . . , i2 − 1. The last inequality follows since vi2 > vjr and α1 > αi2 .
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is complete.
C Improved Bounds for Learning Outcomes
In this section, we focus on the full information game. For simplicity we assume that all quality factors
γi = 1, and assume that players are sorted so that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn (all proofs extend to the case with
general quality factors by considering effective values γivi in place of valuations everywhere).
The main goal of this Appendix is to prove Theorem 5.2. Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3.1 in
Appendix A for Bayes-Nash equilibria, the proof considers a player i with valuation vi, possible bids of the
form yvi, and uses the fact that the player has no-regret about such alternative bids. In the full information
case, we can handle the player with top valuation separately, and will only use that this player 1 has no regret
about bidding her actual valuation v1. For any other player i, the proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem
3.1 in Appendix A. However, we no longer have to consider separately the case when the player’s optimal
slot is 1. This allows us to drop one requirement for the function g in the definition A.2. We further simplify
that definition by setting δ = β (we have verified that different values for δ do not yield any improvement).
More formally, we will need the following definition.
Definition C.1 Let β ∈ (0, 1]. A function g : [0, 1] → R+ is called β-bounded if the following two
properties hold:
i)
∫ 1
0
g(y) dy ≤ 1,
ii)
∫ 1
z
(1− y)g(y) dy ≥ β − (1 + β)z, ∀z ∈ [0, 1].
The following lemma states the connection of the price of anarchy to the existence of β-bounded func-
tions.
Lemma C.2 Let β ∈ (0, 1] be such that a β-bounded function exists. Then, the price of total anarchy of the
Generalized Second Price auction in the full information setting is at most 1 + 1/β.
Proof. In the proof, we consider a GSP auction game with n slots with click-through-rates α1 ≥ α2 ≥
. . . ≥ αn ≥ 0 and n conservative players with valuations v1, v2, . . . , vn ≥ 0. Let b denote the bids of the
players at a coarse correlated equilibrium.
We begin by lower-bounding the expected utility of each player at a coarse correlated equilibrium. We
first consider player 1 and her deviation to the bid v1. Then, player 1 would always be allocated slot 1 and
would pay the highest bid among the remaining players (which is at most bπ(1)) per click. By the definition
of the coarse correlated equilibrium such a deviation does not increase her expected utility (as the player has
no regret), i.e.,
E[u1(b)] ≥ E[u1(v1,b−1)] ≥ E[α1(v1 − bπ(1))] ≥ βα1v1 − βE[α1bπ(1)], (10)
where the last inequality follows since v1 ≥ bπ(1) and since β ∈ (0, 1]. Now, consider the deviation of
player i to the deterministic bid b′i ≤ vi. Then, she would be assigned to slot i or higher and would get
40
utility at least αi(vi − b′i) when the i-th highest bid is smaller than b′i. Again, by the definition of the coarse
correlated equilibrium such a deviation does not increase her expected utility, i.e.,
E[ui(b)] ≥ E[ui(b′i,b−i)] ≥ E[αi(vi − b′i)1{bπ(i) < b′i}].
Using the first property in Definition C.1 for g as well as the last inequality (with b′i = yvi) , we have
E[ui(b)] ≥
∫ 1
0
g(y) · E[ui(b)] dy
≥
∫ 1
0
g(y) · E[αi(vi − yvi)1{bπ(i) < yvi}] dy
= E[αivi
∫ 1
0
(1− y)g(y)1{bπ(i) < yvi}dy]
= E[αivi
∫ 1
bpi(i)/vi
(1− y)g(y) dy].
We now apply the second property of Definition C.1 for function g to obtain
E[ui(b)] ≥ E[βαivi − (1 + β)αibπ(i)] = βαivi − (1 + β)E[αibπ(i)]. (11)
By summing over all players and using inequalities (10) and (11), we have∑
i
E[ui(b)] = E[u1(b)] +
∑
i≥2
E[ui(b)]
≥ β
∑
i
αivi − (1 + β)
∑
i
E[αibπ(i)] + E[α1bπ(1)]
= βOPT (v)− (1 + β)
∑
i
E[αibπ(i)] + E[α1bπ(1)].
Now, we use this last inequality in the same way we used inequality (5) in the proof of Lemma A.1. By
the fact that the social welfare is the sum of the expected utilities of the players plus the total payments, we
obtain
E[SW (π(b),v)] = E[
∑
i
ui(b)] + E[
∑
i
αibπ(i+1)]
≥ βOPT (v)− (1 + β)
∑
i
E[αibπ(i)] + E[α1bπ(1)] +
∑
i≥2
E[αibπ(i)]
= βOPT (v)− β
∑
i
E[αibπ(i)]
≥ βOPT (v)− βE[SW (π(b),v)],
which implies that the price of total anarchy OPT (v)/E[SW (π(b),v)] is at most 1 + 1/β, as desired.
We are ready to complete the proof of Theorem 5.2. By Lemma C.2, it suffices to find a β-bounded
function with β as high as possible. Let λ ≈ 0.4328 be the solution of the equation 1− λ+ ln (1− λ) = 0
and g : [0, 1] → R+ be the function defined as follows:
g(y) =
{ 1
(1−λ)(1−y) , y ∈ [0, λ]
0, y ∈ (λ, 1]
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We will show that g is β-bounded for β = λ1−λ ; the upper bound of 1/λ ≈ 2.3102 stated in Theorem 5.2
will then follow.
Indeed, by the definition of λ, we have
∫ 1
0
g(y) dy =
∫ λ
0
dy
(1− λ)(1− y) = −
ln(1− λ)
1− λ = 1.
Hence, g satisfies the first property of Definition C.1. We also observe that
∫ 1
z
(1− y)g(y) dy =
∫ λ
min{z,λ}
dy
1− λ ≥
λ− z
1− λ = β − (1 + β)z,
i.e., g satisfies the second property of Definition C.1 as well.
D Irrational and Partially Rational Players
In this section we consider the effect of partial rationality on the welfare generated by the GSP auction. We
first consider a setting in which the players are not necessarily perfect utility optimizers, but rather can only
be assumed to apply strategies that form an approximate equilibrium. We then study a setting in which some
fraction of the players bid arbitrarily, without any rationality assumptions beyond avoiding the dominated
strategy of overbidding (see Section 2.3). In both cases, we find that the social welfare guarantees of the
GSP auction degrade continuously with the degree of irrationality present in the players.
D.1 Approximate equilibria
We will consider the social welfare generated by the GSP auction with uncertainty when players play only
approximately utility-maximizing strategies. In Section 3, we assumed that rational players apply strategies
at equilibrium. However, due to limits on rationality or indifference between small differences in utility, it
may be the case that players converge only to an approximate equilibrium. We begin by defining this notion
formally. Given a joint distribution (F,G) over types and quality factors, we say that strategy profile b is an
ǫ-Bayes-Nash equilibrium for distributions F,G if, for all players i, all types vi, and all alternative strategies
bi
′
,
Ev−i,γ,b[ui(bi(vi),b−i(v−i), γ)|vi] ≥ (1− ǫ)Ev−i,γ,b[ui(b′i(vi),b−i(v−i), γ)|vi].
Notice our choice of the multiplicative definition of approximate equilibria, justified by the fact that we have
chosen not to scale values to lie in [0, 1].
We define the ǫ-Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy to be
sup
F,G,b(·)∈ǫ-BNE
Ev,γ [OPT (v, γ)]
Ev,γ,b(v)[SW (π(b(v), γ),v, γ)]
where ǫ-BNE is the set of all ǫ-Bayes-Nash equilibria.
We now claim that our bound for social welfare at (non-approximate) equilibrium degrades continuously
as we relax the degree to which a bidding strategy only approximates an equilibrium.
Theorem D.1 The ǫ-Bayes-Nash price of anarchy of the Generalized Second Price auction is at most
1.2553 + (1− ǫ)−1 · 1.6722.
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The intuition behind Theorem D.1 is that the bound for exact equilibria obtained in Theorem 3.1 depends
on the Bayes-Nash equilibrium condition in a continuous way. This continuity is captured by the semi-
smoothness of the GSP auction (as well as by inequality (5), used to prove Theorem 3.1 in Appendix A).
Indeed, the following Lemma follows by a trivial modification to the proof of Lemma A.1.
Lemma D.2 Assume that for every GSP auction game there is a bidding profile b′ and parameters β, δ > 0
such that inequality (5) holds for any strategy profile b. Then the ǫ-Bayes-Nash price of anarchy of the
Generalized Second Price auction is at most (1−ǫ)
−1+δ
β .
It then follows immediately from Lemmas A.3 and A.4 (see Appendix A) that the ǫ-Bayes-Nash price
of anarchy of the GSP auction is at most (1−ǫ)
−1+0.7507
0.7507·0.7966 ≈ 1.2553 + (1− ǫ)−1 · 1.6722.
D.2 Irrational players
We now consider a setting in which, of the n advertisers who bid in the GSP auction, some subset of them
are “irrational” and cannot be assumed to apply strategies at equilibrium. We still think of the irrational
advertisers as being true players in the GSP auction, with valuations and quality scores. The irrational
advertisers simply may not apply rational bidding strategies; for example, they may not have experience
with the GSP auction, or not know about historical bidding patterns.
Our setting will be an extension of the GSP auction with uncertainty. We will first provide some defini-
tions. Given valuations v, quality scores γ, an outcome π, and a set S of players, the social welfare restricted
to set S is SWS(π,v, γ) =
∑
i∈S απ−1(i)γivi, the total value of the outcome π for the advertisers in S. The
optimal social welfare restricted to S is OPTS(v, γ) = maxπ SWS(π,v, γ).
Given a joint distribution (F,G) over types and quality factors, and a set S of players, we say that
strategy profile b is an S-Bayes-Nash equilibrium for distributions F,G if, for all players i ∈ S, all types
vi, and all alternative strategies bi′,
Ev−i,γ,b[ui(bi(vi),b−i(v−i), γ)|vi] ≥ Ev−i,γ,b[ui(b′i(vi),b−i(v−i), γ)|vi].
That is, no player in S can improve her utility by modifying her bid, but no such restriction is imposed upon
the players outside S.
We will show that, for each set S of players, the total expected social welfare obtained by GSP at an
S-Bayes-Nash equilibrium is a good approximation to E[OPTS(v)]. We can interpret this result as stating
that the addition of irrational players does not significantly degrade the social welfare that would have been
generated had they not participated. Note that we cannot hope to always obtain a good approximation to
E[OPT (v)] (the optimal social welfare of all advertisers) at all S-Bayes-Nash equilibria; for example, it
may be that the valuations of the players outside S are very large, but they choose (irrationally) to bid 0.
We note that our no-overbidding assumption (Section 2.3) continues to apply to all players, not only
to the players in S. In other words, we require that bi(vi) ≤ vi for all i 6∈ S and all vi. We feel this is a
natural restriction to impose even on “irrational” advertisers, as overbidding is an easily-avoided dominated
strategy. Moreover, it is arguable that inexperienced advertisers would bid conservatively, and not risk a
large payment with no gain.6
6This relies on the simplifying assumption that all advertisers have knowledge of their own private valuations. Admittedly, this
requires a certain level of sophistication and may be difficult to attain in practice. Our argument is thus limited to imperfect strategy
choice given perfect knowledge of types. It remains open to extend this analysis to players who may misunderstand their own
valuations.
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Formally, given a non-empty subset S of advertisers, we define the S-Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy to
be
sup
F,G,b(·)∈S-BNE
Ev,γ [OPTS(v, γ)]
Ev,γ,b(v)[SW (π(b(v), γ),v, γ)]
where S-BNE is the set of all S-Bayes-Nash equilibria.
Our main result is the following extension of Theorem 3.1.
Theorem D.3 For any non-empty subset S of rational advertisers, the S-Bayes-Nash price of anarchy of
the Generalized Second Price auction is at most 2.927.
In order to prove this theorem, we need an inequality similar to inequality (5) in Section A. In particular, for
every bid profile b, there exists a bid profile b′ defined on the rational advertisers such that
∑
i∈S
E[ui(b
′
i(vi),b−i, γ)] ≥ βE[OPTS(v, γ)]−(1+δ)
∑
i∈S
E[αν(i)γπ(ν(i))bπ(ν(i))]+E[α1γπ(1)bπ(1)]. (12)
We can prove inequality (12) by following the same steps as in the proof of Lemma A.3 and by consider-
ing the utilities of the rational players at their most profitable deviation. Here, ν(i) should be interpreted as
the slot the rational advertiser i occupies in the efficient allocation restricted to S and π(j) is the advertiser
that occupies the j-th slot in allocation π (this advertiser can be rational or irrational). Similarly, πi(j) is the
player with the j-th highest effective bid among all advertisers besides the rational advertiser i.
All the arguments hold in this case as well. However, there is a minor point that should be justified.
Observe that in order to obtain inequalities (7) and (8), we used the fact that the j-th highest effective
bid (excluding advertiser i) is not larger that the effective value of advertiser i when ν(i) = j, i.e., when
slot j is allocated to advertiser i in the efficient allocation restricted to S. When adapting the proof to the
case of rational and irrational players, it may be the case that ν(i) = j when the rational advertiser i has
valuation vi = x but γπi(j)bπi(j) > γix. This may be due to the fact that player πi(j) is one of the irrational
players. Fortunately, both inequalities (7) and (8) are obviously true in this case as well. Observe that β ≤ δ
(otherwise, the second property of Definition A.2 would not hold for z = 1) and the right-hand side of both
inequalities is non-positive. The changes in the rest of the proof of Lemma A.3 are minor.
Then, Theorem D.3 follows by the next lemma that exploits inequality (12) and using the same values
for β and δ that we used in Section A.
Lemma D.4 Assume that for every GSP auction game with a non-empty set S of rational players there is
a bidding profile b′ for the players in S and parameters β, δ > 0 such that inequality (12) holds for any
strategy profile b. Then, the S-Bayes-Nash price of anarchy of the Generalized Second Price auction is at
most 1+δβ .
Proof. Consider an S-Bayes-Nash equilibrium b. Define b′ as in inequality (12) and observe that E[ui(b, γ)] ≥
E[ui(b
′
i(vi),b−i, γ)] for every player i ∈ S. We use this inequality and the fact that the social welfare is at
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least the sum of the expected utilities of the rational advertisers plus the total payments to get
E[SW (π(b(v), γ),v, γ)] ≥
∑
i∈S
E[ui(b, γ)] +
∑
i
E[αiγπ(i+1)bπ(i+1)]
≥
∑
i∈S
E[ui(b
′
i(vi),b−i, γ)] +
∑
i≥2
E[αiγπ(i)bπ(i)]
≥ βE[OPTS(v, γ)] − (1 + δ)
∑
i∈S
E[αν(i)γπ(ν(i))bπ(ν(i))] + E[α1γπ(1)bπ(1)] +
∑
i≥2
E[αiγπ(i)bπ(i)]
≥ βE[OPTS(v, γ)] − (1 + δ)
∑
i
E[αiγπ(i)bπ(i)] +
∑
i
E[αiγπ(i)bπ(i)]
= βE[OPTS(v, γ)] − δ
∑
i
E[αiγπ(i)bπ(i)]
≥ βE[OPTS(v, γ)] − δE[SW (π(b(v), γ),v, γ)],
which implies that the S-Bayes-Nash price of anarchy is at most 1+δβ , as desired.
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